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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ROLE OF CAPABILITIES IN INNOVATION ADOPTION DECISIONS 
FEBRUARY 2013 
KEVIN SNYDER, B.S. VIRGINIA TECH 
M.B.A. UNIVERSITY OF OREGON 
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Bruce C. Skaggs 
 
 
Successful innovations have been assumed by prior literature to ultimately be 
adopted by all competitors within an industry based on social explanations or economic 
rationale specific to the efficiency of the innovation.  However, capabilities possessed by 
a firm can enhance or inhibit the adoption based upon their similarity to those used in the 
innovation.  In categorizing a firm’s capabilities as complementary, substitutive, or 
neutralizing to the innovation, this study provides an economic explanation for the role of 
internal capabilities in adoption decisions.   
Using a sample of professional football teams adopting the West Coast Offense, I 
find that capabilities influence the decision process in favor of adopting for organizations 
with complementary and substitutive capabilities.  Knowledge from the innovator is 
highlighted in adopting the innovation, but fails to moderate the relationship between 
adoption and firm performance.  I also illustrate how adopting firms with complementary 
capabilities outperform those organizations with similar capabilities that elect not to 
adopt.  Finally, I demonstrate that firms with neutralizing capabilities are better off not 
adopting the innovation based on comparative performance of adopters and non-adopters.  
The overall results suggest a greater emphasis on internal capabilities of the firm in 
 viii 
 
innovation adoption and reconsideration of theories stating that innovations should be 
adopted throughout an industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………...……..…………………………………..…...v 
ABSTRACT……………………………..…………………………………………..vii 
LIST OF TABLES……..……………..…………………………………………...…xii 
LIST OF FIGURES……...………..………………………………………………...xiii 
CHAPTER 
1. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………...1 
2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS………………………………………………7 
2.1 Nature of Innovations…………………………………………………………7 
2.1.1 Definition of Innovation….…………………………………………...7 
2.1.2 Environmental Characteristics of Innovation……………………….10 
2.1.3 Studies of Non-Adoption……………………………………………17 
2.2 Enhancers and Inhibitors of Innovation Adoption…………………………..21 
2.2.1 Capabilities of the Firm.……………………………………………..21 
2.2.2 Bundling and Deployment of Resources…………………………….26 
2.3 Facilitators of Diffusion……………………………………………………...27 
2.3.1 Codified Knowledge…………………………………………………28 
2.3.2 Adoption through Hiring……………………………………………..29 
2.3.3 Development of Capabilities…………………………………………32 
3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT……………………………………………...35 
3.1 Hypotheses and Theoretical Model………………………………………….35 
3.1.1 Empirical Model………….………………………………………….35 
 x 
 
3.2 Hypotheses on Adoption, Knowledge Transfer, and Performance………….36 
4. DATA AND ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY…………………………………..46 
4.1 Research Sample……………………………………………………………..46 
4.2 Professional Football………………………………………………………...51 
4.3 Innovation of the West Coast Offense……………………………………….53 
4.4 Measurement of Research Variables………………………………………...58 
4.4.1 Dependent Variables………………………………………………...58 
4.4.2 Independent Variables……………………………………………….60 
4.4.3 Control Variables…………………………………………………….65 
5. RESULTS…………………………………………………………………..……68 
5.1 Analysis………………………………………………………………...…….68 
5.2 Hypotheses Regarding Adoption and Non-Adoption of the Innovation.……70 
5.2.1 Hypothesis One – Complementary Capabilities and Adoption…..….74 
5.2.2 Hypothesis Two – Substitutive Capabilities and Adoption ………....75 
5.2.3 Hypothesis Three – Neutralizing Capabilities and Adoption……..…75 
5.3 Hypotheses Regarding the Role of Knowledge……………………………...76 
5.3.1 Hypothesis Four – Knowledge as Moderator…….………....…….…78 
5.4 Hypotheses Regarding Performance…………………………………………79 
5.4.1 Hypothesis 5a – Complementary Capabilities and Performance...…..80 
5.4.2 Hypothesis 5b – Substitutive Capabilities and Performance………...80 
5.4.3 Hypothesis 5c – Neutralizing Capabilities and Performance………..81 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION………………………………………….83 
6.1 Discussion…………………………………………………………………....83 
 xi 
 
6.1.1 Discussion of Results Regarding Adoption…………………………84 
6.1.2 Discussion of Results Regarding Knowledge Acquisition………….91 
6.1.3 Discussion of Results on Firm Performance and Adoption…………95 
6.2 Conclusion……………………………...…………………………………..101 
6.2.1 Implications for Research...……………………...…………………102 
6.2.2 Implications for Practice………………………….………………...104 
6.3 Limitations and Areas of Future Research………………..………………...105 
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………....…..……109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table                       Page 
1. Points Scored by Offensive Categorization………………………………….......55 
2. Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………………………..71 
3. Correlations………………………………………………………………………71 
4. Regression Model for H1, H2, & H3 – With Free Agency……………………...73 
5. Regression Model for H1, H2, & H3 – Without Free Agency…………………..74 
6. Complementary Capabilities and Knowledge…………………………………...77 
7. Substitutive Capabilities and Knowledge………………………………………..77 
8. Mean Point Differentials by Capability Type……………………………………79 
9. Regression for Complementary Capabilities…...………………………………..80 
10. Regression for Substitutive Capabilities…………………………………………81 
11. Regression for Neutralizing Capabilities……………………………………...…81 
12. Summary of Results by Hypothesis……………………………………………...82 
13. Matrix of Innovation Research…………………………………………………..86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiii 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure               Page 
1. Conceptual Model of Innovation Adoption………….………………………….…..35
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Innovation has been a major theme of research in strategic management.  
Innovation has been called the lifeblood of an organization (Kelley, 2005), a driver of 
competitive advantage (Grant, 1996) and a force to drive the economy (Grossman & 
Helpman, 2001).  Innovation can take the shape of products, services, routines, processes 
and industries (Rogers, 1995).  Scholars and practitioners have long recognized that 
innovation - the ability to redeploy assets and meet continued customer demands - is an 
essential function of business.  As a facilitator of new ideas and organizational change, 
innovation allows a firm to continue to grow and thrive within a competitive 
environment. 
Although innovation is frequently connected to invention, the two concepts differ 
in scale and practice.  Invention was a popular topic of study amongst early researchers 
describing the conditions under which new products created economic benefits 
(Schumpeter, 1939; Arrow, 1962).  The study of how firms utilize new ideas to create 
economic benefits evolved into the broader term of innovation, used to capture the 
development of both tangible and intangible ideas.  Scholars also begin to differentiate 
between the two terms, with invention defined as bringing something into being and 
innovation defined as bringing something into new use (Rogers, 1995). 
At this same time, marketers, sociologists, and communications scholars began to 
examine the flow of ideas (Robertson, 1967; Hull & Hage, 1982; Rogers, 1995).  
Differing from a strategy perspective, these fields sought the promotion and rapid 
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diffusion of an innovation for economic and political motivations.  As studies of 
innovation coalesced into one body of literature, theories primarily addressed ways to 
enhance the information flow due to their profound societal benefits (Tewksbury, et al., 
1980).  While these theories have been helpful, recent research has suggested a need for 
more rigorous analysis of an innovation before final adoption, since the extant view on 
innovation assumes that the product or service will be ultimately accepted (Abrahamson, 
1991; Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1990; Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993). 
Despite these motives, the thorough and well-chronicled research on the spread of 
innovation has contributed significantly to our understanding of strategy (Rogers, 1995).  
Beyond simply designing new products and services, the value of imitation has been 
illustrated as a unique skill to keep firms current (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).  Emerging 
from this literature are themes that promote the spread of ideas, encourage replication, 
and accelerate the flow of knowledge from one entity to another.  However, in a 
competitive landscape, an innovator faces the challenge of diffusing their product or 
service throughout their firm and to customers while simultaneously preventing a rival 
firm from duplicating the idea (Winter & Szulanski, 2001).  This becomes particularly 
difficult due to the ability to re-engineer products or replicate services in a similar context 
(Teece & Pisano, 1994).  Any advantages derived from the initial innovation disappear if 
competitors are able to immediately respond with similar offerings.  Although legal 
protections may protect some knowledge creation, ideas are quickly assimilated into the 
knowledge base of industry (Winter & Szulanski, 2001; Teece & Pisano, 1994). 
The exuberance towards innovation has led to a pro-innovation bias that assumes 
inevitable adoption and benefits flowing to the imitator (Abrahamson, 1991; Abrahamson 
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& Rosenkopf, 1990).  The basis for much of the early innovation research stems from 
agriculture studies promoting the generation of higher crop yields (Rogers, 1995).  In this 
setting, many farmers were part of a collective, organized to manage the interests of 
members by sharing knowledge and resources.  Much of the current theoretical 
foundation for innovation also stems from medical research that analyzes adoption of 
vaccines in third world countries (Rogers, 1995).  Research has already proven the 
effectiveness of these strategies, thus decreasing the uncertainty and increasing the 
market for the innovation.  While research on adoption rates and barriers has been 
essential, the application of these theories is restricted based on the nature of the 
innovation.  In each of these instances, the creator of the innovation has an incentive to 
ensure that the innovation is diffused throughout the industry.  However, in a competitive 
environment, organizations do not want their strategies or routines mimicked by others.  
To date, little research has been able to isolate the competitive effects of innovation 
diffusion or why firms may intentionally decide not to adopt an innovation. 
Why would an organization decide not to adopt a superior innovation?  
Intentionally rejecting an innovation might initially seem like an ill-fated decision for a 
manager.  Scholars have suggested that the non-adopting firms are simply unfamiliar 
with the innovation or cannot see the efficiency of the idea.  In these instances, firms 
eventually become late adopters, falling into the long tail of innovation (Rogers, 1995).  
However, although firms share similar goals, their methods for achieving these may 
differ based on resources, organizational structure, and types of available knowledge.  As 
the acquisition of these resources becomes path dependent (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), 
organizations lock themselves into strategies and resources that prohibit an easy shift into 
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new territories.  Commitment towards a strategy and resource profile is necessary for a 
firm to develop core capabilities (Grant, 1996).  Successful firms are able to evolve their 
capabilities into a competitive advantage; however, firms that are unable to adapt become 
ensnared with “core rigidities” and competency traps (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levitt & 
March, 1988).   
While lack of adaptation can certainly be harmful to firms, I suggest that 
organizations that are already proficient in certain capabilities may have different 
incentives and abilities to adopt or reject an innovation.  Recognizing the futility in 
continually chasing different resources and adopting new innovations, organizations may 
be able to re-bundle and deploy existing assets in a manner that can substitute for or 
neutralize the impact of a competitor’s innovation.  This research will build on our 
knowledge of innovation diffusion by proposing new theories of how organizations make 
adoption decisions by analyzing the capabilities and future performance of firms in a 
competitive environment. 
Despite the prevalence of innovation within academic research, few studies have 
examined how relative capability strength in comparison to the innovator.  Even fewer 
have sought to explain how a firm could succeed after rejecting a superior innovation.  
Many of the early studies on the topic were biased case-studies of new technology, 
selected due to the familiarity of the innovation and the success in diffusion.  From this 
initial work, a pro-innovation bias ensued, with few studies challenging the assertion that 
adopting is a necessary strategic move.  Few studies also investigate how firms fare after 
their adoption decision.  As a result, there are substantial questions that remain regarding 
how adoption decisions are made and if non-adopters can flourish in these environments. 
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This dissertation seeks to develop theories relating to the role of capabilities in 
innovation adoption decisions.  In looking at how a competitor would analyze their 
capabilities with those needed to implement an innovation, I answer four questions 
regarding how organizations respond to strategic innovations.  First, how do capabilities 
influence adoption decisions?  Second, why would an organization intentionally decide 
not to adopt a superior innovation?  Third, how do these strategic non-adopters perform 
relative to those that do implement the innovation?  Finally, does the acquisition of 
knowledge from the innovator assist in adopting the innovation? 
In suggesting that firms may intentionally decide not to adopt an innovation, this 
study breaks from the pro-innovation bias that is inherent in much of the previous 
literature.  I suggest that lack of adoption may occur for several reasons, including an 
inability to access key knowledge sources, a lack of congruence with current capabilities 
and resources, and access to capabilities that can neutralize the success of the innovation.  
This study seeks to make conceptual and empirical contributions towards an 
understanding of innovation and an organization’s processes regarding adoption.  By 
removing assumptions of firm improvement from current theories, this dissertation 
contributes by illustrating boundary conditions towards adoption and offers empirical 
explanations using capabilities as a factor in determining an adoption strategy.   
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as described below.  Chapter 2 
provides a review of the literature related to innovation and diffusion.  Within the domain 
of innovation, I examine the nature of innovation and antecedents towards adoptions.  I 
continue by examining research on the enhancing and inhibiting attributes of firm 
capabilities.  An analysis of the relationship between capabilities and innovation will be 
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used to explain the adoption patterns within an industry.  Finally, literature on other 
factors that determine the success of adoption will be examined.  In Chapter 3, I describe 
the propositions outlining the research questions previously mentioned.  Chapter 4 
follows with the methodology used to test the hypotheses.  Included is a description of 
the archival data from the National Football League used to study organizational 
capabilities, adoption decisions, and the movement of key personnel related to the 
innovation.  In Chapter 5, I explain the results of the empirical analysis that provides 
support for my hypotheses.  Chapter 6 concludes with limitations, future research, and a 
final discussion of the findings in this paper. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
 The conceptual framework that underlies the development of innovation theory 
will be explained in the section below.  First, I will review prior literature related to 
innovation, including characteristics of innovations, actions that produce a competitive 
response, and the process of diffusion.  The second section will include analysis of how 
the transfer of innovation from one organization or department to another is dependent 
upon firm capabilities.  As this is the basis for explaining the integration process inherent 
to innovation adoption, this analysis will include discussion of how a firm’s capabilities 
relate to the innovation.  Finally, I will discuss facilitators of successful adoptions, 
including firms acquiring knowledge from innovating organizations.   
 
2.1 Nature of Innovation 
 Despite significant amounts of academic research devoted to innovation, there are 
still many questions that have yet to be answered.  However, the literature paints a picture 
of the characteristics of an innovation, the types of innovation that diffuse, and how firms 
make decisions about adopting the innovation.  This section will analyze the current state 
of innovation within the academic literature.   
 
2.1.1 Definition of Innovation 
 Innovation has been an area of interest to scholars dating back to some of the first 
studies of economics and organizations.  The broad definitions proposed by scholars have 
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simultaneously broadened our understanding of how firms create new ideas, yet also 
failed to put boundary conditions on what constitutes innovative activity.  Among the 
challenges of arriving at a single definition for innovation is the fact that many 
disciplines, including economics, management, sociology, and communications, are 
actively involved in investigating the phenomenon.  Throughout the various literatures, 
over 60 definitions have been proposed and used in research (Baregheh, et al., 2009).  
Given the range of firms engaged in innovation, these broad definitions of the 
phenomenon seek to capture multiple types of ideas, from product invention to process 
evolution to resource deployment.  
Among the first scholars to propose a definition of innovation was Josef 
Schumpeter.  While describing the importance of entrepreneurship and the emergence of 
new firms, Schumpeter (1934) illustrates innovation as a fundamental attribute that 
creates capital for firms.  Through a process of creative destruction, economies benefit as 
inefficient products and processes are constantly improved.  Schumpeter suggests that 
these innovation-based rents - entrepreneurial in nature - are generated from changing the 
rules of competing within the industry.  Describing the process of “entrepreneurship,” 
Schumpeter explains that innovation occurs when a firm has “means to combine 
materials and forces differently” (1934, p.65).   
Alternatively, Penrose (1959) identifies innovation as “the use of exactly the same 
resources, used for different purposes or in different ways in combination with different 
types of other resources.”  Additionally, among the most straight forward definitions is 
Thompson’s (1965, p.2) description as “the generation, acceptance and implementation 
of new ideas, processes, products or services.”  Further definitions have sought to 
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differentiate invention from innovation.  In defining invention as the creative act, 
innovation becomes the first employment of an idea by one organization (Becker & 
Whisler, 1967).  These definitions reflect a broadening of the concept of innovation, 
moving beyond simply invention and entrepreneurship.  Later, scholars would include 
more activities within a definition of innovation to include any recombination of 
previously held knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  However, some of these 
definitions include almost all activities related to the operations of a firm, as new 
knowledge is constantly being incorporated into an organization.  Critics of this broad 
definition have suggested more specific definitions, noting that “it is practically 
impossible to do things identically” (Hansen & Wakonen, 1997, p.350). 
As the study of innovation progressed, definitions emerged to delineate between 
different types of innovative activity.  With unique antecedents towards creation and 
adoption, definitions of product, process, and service innovation were created to highlight 
the roles of stakeholders (West & Anderson, 1996), technology (Nord & Tucker, 1987), 
knowledge (Plessis, 2007), and management (Birkinshaw, et al., 2008).  Actions of 
differentiating innovation versus imitation spurred debate based upon whether the 
“newness” was specific to the industry or simply to an adopting firm (Birkinshaw, et al., 
2008).    While many scholars have embraced innovation as “state of the art” 
(Abrahamson, 1996; Kimberly 1981), others recognize that idea “new to the 
organization” (Zbaracki, 1998; McCabe, 2002) are an important type of innovative 
activity. 
Recent studies have called for a multidisciplinary definition of the term 
(Baregheh, et al., 2009).  Efforts have also been made to synthesize the research on 
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innovation in an effort to draw conclusions across fields and highlight pertinent 
outstanding questions (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010).  Though not attempting to create a 
separate definition, for the purposes of this research, I will approach innovation as an idea 
that is new to the industry, while recognizing diffusion as the process of firms 
implementing the idea that is new to their organization.  In the creation of the innovation, 
I recognize the definition to include the novel recombination and creation of resources 
that can be used by the firm for economic gain. 
 
2.1.2 Environmental Characteristics of Innovation 
There are many different characteristics and contexts of innovation that have 
driven the numerous definitions.  The radicalness and complexity of the innovation, 
degree of competition, and status of the innovator can all impact the success and 
diffusion of the novel idea (Rogers, 1995; Cossan & Apaydin, 2010).  Research in this 
area examines how the environment can influence the legitimacy and spread, for better or 
worse, of the innovation.  Determining which ideas “new to the organization” get 
implemented depends on competitive dynamics, similarity to current offerings, and 
degree of change (Zbaracki, 1998; McCabe, 2002). 
Early innovation studies sought to determine macroeconomic factors that 
impacted a firm’s ability to capture new rents.  To successfully innovate, Schumpeter 
argues that firms need low levels of competition so that significant resources can be 
allocated to research and development (Schumpeter, 1934; Winter, 2006).  As innovation 
can be a risky activity, there must be slack resources that allow the firm to make mistakes 
in the development of new products.  In Schumpeter’s theory, market power ensures the 
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ability of an innovator to commercialize the product, and therefore enables a first mover 
advantage.  This process of “creative destruction” enables entrepreneurs to disrupt a 
market system and procure a monopolistic position (Schumpeter, 1939).  In these low 
levels of competition, innovations do not diffuse with great regularity until the original 
innovator has capitalized financially.  The monopolistic protections inhibit the flow of 
information to competitors and other industries. 
 In contrast, Arrow (1962) proposes that innovation is most suitable to a highly 
competitive environment where new ideas can provide advantages over their rivals.  In 
comparison to a monopolistic environment, incentives are higher in a competitive market 
since a firm can obtain a larger market share and thus higher rents through the trade of 
new ideas.  Competition demands that firms take risks to prosper within the marketplace.  
Whereas a monopolist with high profit margins can be reasonably certain of future 
success, the firm in a competitive industry knows that their environment is more 
susceptible to a change in market leader.  Arrow also illustrates the paradoxical nature of 
knowledge trade due to the buyers’ lack of familiarity with the information they are 
acquiring (thus the reason they must make the purchase).  With the increased 
competition, innovation is also risky due to the competitors’ ability to imitate, thereby 
reducing a long term advantage derived from the innovation.  However, Arrow’s theories 
illustrate the constant cycle of rapid innovation and diffusion necessary in highly 
competitive markets. 
The debate about environmental conditions for innovation remains among the 
issues that have arisen amongst scholars in the study of the phenomenon.  Schumpeter 
and Arrow’s opposing views on market factors have launched significant attention to 
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innovation in future studies.  Significantly, these studies played a role in recognizing the 
role of competition within the creation of new ideas.  The levels of competition can 
impact firms’ ability to profit from their innovative activities, thus potentially stimulating 
or stalling diffusion. 
The studies of Schumpeter and Arrow also drove progress within the innovation 
literature, leading to a classification of firms based their likelihood towards the 
acceptance of innovations.  Some of the earliest variables examined include the 
classification of firms on a continuum between “entrepreneurial” and “conservative” 
(Miller & Friesen, 1982).  Differences in firm structure were suggested as explanations 
for greater innovative capabilities that impacted a firm’s willingness to take risks with 
new activities through creation or adoption.  Bureaucratic control and roles of 
management dictate how a firm approaches both internal and external ideas.  Depending 
on management’s risk tolerance, a high degree of management control may lead to 
successful implementation (regardless of the origin of the innovation) since a large 
number of resources are needed to bring an external or internal innovation to market 
(Zaltman et al., 1973).  However, too much control may also suppress ideas from 
emerging organically (Damanpour, 1991).   
 Beyond management’s risk tolerance, the nature of the innovation, ranging from 
incremental to radical, can also determine the industry’s acceptance of the idea (Dewar & 
Dutton, 1986).  Incremental innovations can be seen as reinforcing current products and 
services, while radical innovations significantly transform existing products and services 
or design entirely new ones (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005).  The number of 
organizational processes involved in the innovation is also a reflection of the radicalness 
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of an innovation.  Even though the change to a product or service may seem slight, if a 
firm must redesign the entire scope of their operations to meet the new standard, an 
innovation can be declared radical (Damanpour, 1991).  Given the increased complexity 
and information asymmetry of a radical innovation, these ideas tend to encounter more 
resistance in the diffusion process.  The degree to which an innovation changes or creates 
an industry impacts the likelihood of adoption.   
Just as the degree of centralization and management control can influence the 
development of new ideas, the same features can impact the likelihood of adopting 
radical innovations.  Regardless of an idea’s origin (internal or external to the firm), 
successful implementation seems to necessitate high levels of firm control and 
formalization.  The paradox of needing low managerial control to innovate but high 
control to implement suggests that not all firms are going to be capable of capitalizing on 
new ideas (Damanpour, 1991). 
Diffusion of an innovation also differs based on the type of processes impacted.  
Classified as technical or administrative, differing types of innovations consist of 
different antecedents and strategies for implementation (Damanpour, 1991).  These 
differences stem from the fact that technical innovations tend to be related to product 
development, while administrative changes are closely related to processes.  The source 
of change also differs as product innovations generally occur to capitalize on customer 
demand and are driven by forces outside the firm.  Meanwhile, process innovations 
improve the efficiency of a firm’s operations and are influenced by internal forces within 
the firm.  Based on these characteristics, technical innovations thrive in environments 
where there are high degrees of professionalism, an informal structure, and low degrees 
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of centralization.  On the other hand, administrative innovations prosper with low levels 
of professionalism, structured management, and a high amount of centralized control 
(Daft, 1978; Damanpour, 1991). 
The competitive position of the innovator can also be a determining factor in the 
spread of an innovation.  Competitors can be seen as a source of new ideas and additional 
market knowledge.  Firms frequently use groups of competitors as their peer group as 
they determine strategic direction (Semadeni & Anderson, 2010).   Imitation may occur 
in an attempt to maintain market share and position within the industry.  However, radical 
ideas are viewed with more skepticism, allowing competitors to bear the risk until the 
innovation has been proven.  Since there is unlikely to be a steady stream of information 
sharing, competitors may shun radical innovations such as to avoid risk and perceptions 
of holding extreme positions within the market (Semadeni & Anderson, 2010).  Imitating 
a radical idea is also risky due to the high levels of information asymmetry between the 
innovator and the mimicking firm.  Ultimately, organizations measure themselves against 
competitors based on similarity of product offerings, innovative history, and the desire to 
maintain competitive parity (Semadeni & Anderson, 2010). 
Organizations primarily adopt innovations for either informational or social 
purposes (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).  Firms adopting based on information are 
primarily driven by economic means.  Based on theories of economics, when information 
is the primary rationale, firms demand evidence that the new idea will drive economic 
profits within their organization.  As the new idea is proven to be successful, information 
about the product or service is quickly assimilated into organizations and replicated to 
help firms maintain their position within the competitive landscape (Lieberman & Asaba, 
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2006).  Rather than invest in research and development or take risks of designing new 
architectures, companies may also compete based on replication of innovation as a 
strategy (Winter & Szulanski, 2001).  These firms are also highly capable of replicating 
and transferring their own ideas within multiple locations or branches of their 
organization.  When deciding which innovations to imitate, comparisons are made to like 
firms with similar resources (Massini, et al, 2005).  The search and imitate method of 
adoption decisions is proposed as the rational efficient model of adoption (Abrahamson 
& Rosenkopf, 1991).  Firms implementing within this model adopt only when economic 
gain can be reasonably assured. 
Other scholars propose isomorphism as an explanation for imitation of an 
innovation (Lieberman & Adaba, 2006; Greve, 1996).  When many firms in one industry 
compete with similar resources for similar customers, each may feel a social need to 
adopt the behavior of others.  This sociological explanation for adoption suggests that a 
desire for the appearance of legitimacy influences managerial decision making (March, 
1981).  Differing from the information based theories of adoption, firms adopting for 
social reasons may be slow to respond to new information about the efficacy of an 
innovation.  In an effort to maintain their competitive positions, firms may miss 
opportunities to improve financial performance either through failing to adopt a 
successful idea or holding onto a costly product or service for too long (Lieberman & 
Asaba, 2006).   
Similar to the sociological explanations, game theories have also been used to 
explain imitation and adoption (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).  Firms use innovation and 
adoption to signal shifts in strategy to rivals as a method of competition that seeks to limit 
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competition (Greve, 1996).  While similar to collusion, these strategies primarily exist to 
minimize risk.  Adoption based on rivalry or a social desire to maintain the status quo 
may lead to the homogenization of resources within an industry, thus exposing all firms 
to higher levels of risk.  If all firms adopt inefficient innovations out of a “follow the 
leader” mindset, all organizations may suffer from the failure of the idea (Lieberman & 
Asaba, 2006).   
Regardless of the original reasons for adoption, innovations tend to follow similar 
rates of adoption along the S-curve, from the early adopters to the laggards (Rogers, 
1995).  The adoption decisions along the S-curve are influenced by a number of factors, 
including level of codification, ability to experiment with the idea, complexity, 
comparability, and advantage derived from adopting (Rogers, 1995).  As with the social 
explanation for adoption, organizations are influenced by reference groups and the 
market position of the innovator (Massini, et al., 2005; Aboulnasr, et al., 2008). 
While these studies examine adoption at different points in the lifecycle of the 
product or service, the assumption is made that firms will ultimately adopt.  In addition, 
these studies fail to take performance into account, instead assuming that a performance 
increase will automatically accrue through adoption.  Whether for economic or social 
reasons, early or late in the adoption cycle, the literature on innovation diffusion 
consolidates around firms that do adopt, while assuming that non-adopters lack proper 
information or are somehow unable to implement the new idea. 
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2.1.3 Studies of Non-Adoption 
In total, research has found several characteristics that influence the diffusion of 
an innovation.  The degree of competition, risk tolerance of management, radicalness of 
the innovation, area of operations, and market position of the innovator can all impact the 
acceptance of a new idea.  The combination of these variables will lead some 
organizations to adopt almost immediately, while others wait until further information 
can be gathered or until they are forced to adopt by market forces (Rogers, 1995).  
Additionally, rates of adoption are influenced by the relative advantage provided, 
compatibility with the innovation, complexity, ability to sample the idea, and the 
observability of the idea (Rogers, 1995).  Although innovation diffusion has made 
significant progress, current research is unable to answer many questions surrounding the 
non-adoption of innovations.  This section will address research on non-adopters and 
illustrate the rational efficient and fad models of diffusion.  Advantages of these models 
will be discussed as well as areas where they fail to explain the behaviors of firms. 
Born from the early agricultural and medical innovation studies, the rational 
efficient model suggests that firms will adopt the innovation once they believe that the 
innovation can be efficiently integrated into their organization and will produce greater 
returns than currently receiving (Rogers, 1995; March, 1981).  In this theory, firms have 
access to the complete set of information necessary to make decisions and always make 
rational decisions.  Organizations can independently choose whether or not to adopt a 
particular innovation because their goals are certain and the outcomes of their actions are 
predictable (Abrahamson, 1991).  As more firms adopt the innovation, information 
becomes more prevalent and the cost of accessing this information decreases, thus 
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leading to more adoptions (Mansfield, 1961).  Returns from the innovation decrease over 
time and the competitive advantage erodes, thereby leaving first movers with the most 
benefits.   
Many of the studies in this paradigm assume groups of firms with similar goals.  
This implies that firms can narrow gaps in performance between their organization and 
market leaders by adopting similar strategies.  Economic analysis suggests competing 
explanations for the performance gaps, including external environmental factors driving 
performance, as well as internal advancements that create gaps among competitors.  
External factors, such as organizations exerting political influence, may also mandate 
adoption or rejection of an innovation.  These specific situations are worthy of note, but 
lack theoretical implications here.  Rational efficient models explain non-adoption 
through an assumption of differing goals within an industry or the inability of the 
innovation to close the performance gap due to environmental changes.   
Support for this model grew from the goals of the early innovation literature.  As 
in the initial works, as information spreads across a population and provides evidence of 
greater efficiencies, the rational efficient model can be applied.  Given the ambiguity and 
uncertainty involved in adopting an innovation, firms must continue to incorporate 
information about the adoption success of competitors.  When an innovation fails to 
result in success, the spread of this information deters future adopters.  Furthering 
rational explanations of diffusion, organizations recognize the failure of others and are 
able to make productive adoption decisions based on this information (Greve, 2011).  
Rather than simply following the pack, firms have demonstrated an ability to change 
course after processing more current information. 
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Diffusion has also been explained through fashions and fads (Abrahamson, 1991; 
Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).  The central theorem of this social perspective suggests that 
organizations adopt an innovation simply because a competitor does.  Unlike the rational 
efficient model, information about the efficiency of an innovation is unnecessary.  
Pressures to adopt can arise internally from a firm’s fear of losing a place in the market or 
externally from influential “opinion leaders” (Mahajan & Peterson, 1985; Abrahamson, 
1991).  The impact of the innovation is less relevant than concerns of industry legitimacy 
and internal support.  Although the potential returns may decrease over time, firms are 
unconcerned with acquiring these benefits, but rather with being seen as out of touch.  
Scholars have analyzed this phenomenon from the perspective of social networks (Carroll 
& Hannon, 1989), market signaling (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1990), and accessibility 
of the knowledge (Rogers, 1995).  Pressures are exerted from internal and external 
sources that promote inefficient decisions to adopt the innovation.  This can also occur as 
an industry simultaneously rejects a potentially efficient innovation (Abrahamson & 
Rosenkopf, 1993).   
Scholars of fad models introduce the psychological component of decision 
making processes.  Recognizing that rational choices include more than economic 
motives, managers may follow the competition to protect their job, influence stock prices, 
or attempt to acquire market power (Abrahamson, 1991).  Building from this literature 
are bandwagon theories of management suggesting that firms mimic those who are 
similar in industry, geography, or communication network (Abrahamson, 1991).  As 
such, adoption decisions are linked to industry and organizational norms.  In highly 
competitive industries, firms may feel compelled to match the offerings of competitors 
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for fear of losing market share.  The threat of this industry behavior can also serve as a 
barrier for new entry, deterring start-up firms from launching new initiatives.  Adoption 
is understood based on the degree of conformity to industry norms.  Rejecting the 
innovation is a factor of non-conformity or insusceptibility to the norms.  While these 
behaviors may have consequences beyond the future of the innovation, scholars have 
used them as an explanation for non-adoption.  Bandwagon theory has also been given as 
an explanation for failing to follow bandwagon behaviors.  Counter-bandwagons may be 
formed by sects within an industry as a way of differentiating themselves from firms with 
lower reputations (Abrahamson, 1991).  As primarily an external factor influencing 
diffusion, explanation of this phenomenon is limited to the understanding of the pressures 
driving bandwagon decisions and how bandwagon behaviors are stopped.   
Both the rational efficient and fad model of innovation diffusion assume that the 
technologically superior innovation should ultimately be adopted by all competing firms 
within the industry.  Failure to select the most efficient strategy, whether consideration is 
given to the proposed innovation or another technological path, is explained through 
social norms or incompetent management.  Although both can be highly influential, these 
explanations fail to consider the firm which never finds implementation to be an efficient 
strategy, nor the firm that is able to avoid the pressures from stakeholders or competitors 
and effectively analyze the impacts of their decision.  Ironically, as both of these theories 
are grounded in the assumption that managers make rational choices, neither considers 
non-adoption to be a rational choice.  Even amongst firms with similar goals, there may 
be multiple efficient combinations of resource deployment and bundling that generate 
high returns for the firm.  Although several scholars have lobbied for a more balanced 
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literature, these theories contain similar biases towards innovation and flaws as the 
original studies. 
 
2.2 Enhancers and Inhibitors of Innovation Adoption 
2.2.1 Capabilities of the Firm 
 As innovation grew in popularity as a topic of strategic management research, the 
shift to a resource based view of organizations (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959) led 
scholars to look inside of an organization - rather than the competitive environment - for 
sources of innovative activity.  Within the firm, organizational capabilities have been 
proposed as a source of competitive advantage due to specialist knowledge held by the 
firm (Grant, 1996).  An organizational capability can be defined as “a firm’s ability to 
perform repeatedly a productive task which relates either directly or indirectly to a firm’s 
capacity for creating value through effecting the transformation of inputs into outputs” 
(Grant, 1996: p.4).  Similarly, Winter (2002) also defines organizational capabilities as “a 
high level routine (or collection of routines) that, together with its implementing input 
flows, confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision options for 
producing significant outputs of a particular type” (Winter, 2002: p.1).  In this paper, a 
capability will be considered a repeatable, high-level firm process that utilizes numerous 
resources to reliably produce value for the organization.  Importantly, capabilities require 
the recognition and deployment by management for the firm to fully capture their value.  
Capabilities can evolve through the creation or acquisition of products, processes, and 
knowledge.  Capabilities influence not only what a firm is currently capable of doing, but 
also serve as a platform and threat for entry into other areas (Zander & Kogut, 1995). 
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 Even when a firm aspires to imitate an innovation, mimicking the new ideas is 
dependent upon the imitator’s organizational capabilities.  The speed by which an idea is 
transferred throughout an industry is dependent upon the number of competitors engaged 
in a similar trade, the ease by which an innovation can be understood, and the degree of 
improvement (Zander & Kogut, 1995; Teece, 1977).  While two firms may be rivals, a 
lack of capabilities in a given area decreases the likelihood of imitation.  Even with 
motivation to mimic a peer organization and a similar product profile, a firm may be 
unable to imitate due to the combinative process of innovation (Zander & Kogut, 1995; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992).  An analysis and comparison of capabilities provides insight into 
the likelihood of adoption and can serve as a predictor of post-adoption success.   
 As new capabilities are developed, competitors familiar with the landscape may 
attempt to mimic the innovative capabilities.  Although the innovation literature primarily 
assumes eventual adoption by all competitors within the industry, firms may intentionally 
decide not to adopt these strategic innovations based on the capabilities that they have 
developed.  Differing from myopia or inertia (Levinthal & March, 1993; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1983), these firms may find their capabilities as complementary (Teece, 1986), 
substitutive (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007), or neutralizing 
(Barney, 1991; Porter, 1980) to the innovation.  Each classification has implications for 
managerial decision-making in regards to how an innovation would be integrated into the 
new firm.   
Recognizing the type of capability each firm has developed can impact 
managerial decision-making around which innovations to try and mimic.  Analogous to 
prior research suggesting that firms follow their industry’s market leader (Absoulnasr, et 
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al 2008), capability classification provides managers a more direct comparison to 
competitors.  Imitating dissimilar capabilities may not be logical even when a competitor 
holds a similar market position given the current bundling and deployment of resources. 
As illustrated by Teece (1986), firms with capabilities complementary to the 
innovation have the greatest ability to commercialize the idea.  These organizations can 
integrate the innovation into their routines with relative ease and can recognize greater 
economic benefits when these resources are bundled and deployed together.  These assets 
may be held throughout multiple firms within an industry and have frequently been used 
by imitators to find more success with an innovation than the originator (Teece, 1986; 
Zander & Kogut, 1995).  While the resources present might not be identical, the strategic 
bundling and deployment of resources is designed to accomplish the same goals.  For 
firms with complementary routines, adoption is a possibility since the imitator could seek 
the necessary resources with minimal disruption to their operations.  The level of risk is 
low since few resources need to be acquired and the same assets can be used.  If the 
organization experiences a decrease in performance, these same assets can be redeployed 
in the previous manner without significant cost. 
In contrast to firms with complementary capabilities, firms with substitutive 
capabilities utilize different resources to achieve the same goal (Hess & Rothaermel, 
2011; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007).  Firms with substitutive capabilities differ from those 
with complementary capabilities in that they lack the specific resources needed to adopt 
the innovation.  While the firm is currently oriented towards the same strategic objective, 
resources must be bought on the open market, leading to a higher degree of risk in 
adoption.  Reverting back to the previous deployment is not a simple proposition as the 
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substitutive resources would have been exchanged for the adoption-specific needs.  For 
example, in healthcare, two treatment plans may be substitutes for each other, depending 
on the patient’s needs.  For the patient’s treatment plans, this may involve differing levels 
of inpatient versus outpatient care.  Equivalent nurses and doctors would be involved in 
caring for the patient, but using different routines and procedures for diagnosis and 
treatment.  For this hospital to adopt an innovation, additional training of medical staff 
would be required.  First, the organization would have to bring knowledge of the 
innovation to the hospital, either through reengineering or hiring.  The resources may 
have to be redeployed, including personnel and medical equipment.  None of this would 
ensure success as the hospital may experience a disruption in services.  Although the 
organization may not need a total makeover, the firm is accepting a higher level of risk 
than those with complementary resources.   
Due to the path dependent nature of resource acquisition, firms that have 
neutralizing capabilities may be less likely to take note of an opposing innovation 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  Neutralizing capabilities can be seen as those which neutralize 
the competitive threat posed by the innovation by reducing the market value of the idea 
(Barney, 1991; Porter, 1980).  As capabilities are developed based on the available 
resources, firms with a resource acquisition strategy that differs from the innovator may 
be deterred from pursuing the innovation.  If a firm with neutralizing capabilities were to 
try to adopt, they must overcome not only the inertia of their current strategic deployment 
but also must convince internal and external personnel that the new direction is superior.  
If the firm is currently successful, this strategic shift is highly risky with no guarantee that 
the appropriate resources can be acquired, and without previous knowledge about how to 
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bundle and deploy these resources.  Although knowledge can be acquired on the market, 
sourcing of this manner is expensive and would require a reconfiguration of the entire 
organization.  This eliminates any previously held advantages derived from knowledge 
stocks, current routines, actors, and activities.  
The high levels of agency and improvisation inherent to capabilities lead to a high 
degree of individual and group tacit knowledge within an organization’s routines and 
capabilities (Berman, et al., 2002; Winter & Szulanski, 2001; Feldman & Pentland, 
2003).  Since management and actors within a routine seek to maximize efficiency, 
changing the structure eliminates the previous gains and resets the clock on building a 
competitive advantage.  Moreover, these firms are behind the first mover and potentially 
others in the industry as they develop a capability to accomplish similar goals.  When 
compared to other capabilities, firms operating neutralizing capabilities and considering 
adoption would find duplication to be highly difficult and may elect not to adjust their 
routines to the innovation. 
The classification of capabilities does not suggest that all firms possess particular 
capabilities in relation to the innovation.  The new idea may be in an area of secondary 
interest to a competitor or a market in which an organization does not compete.  
Additionally, a firm may compete in an area without having any distinct capabilities at 
all.  While these firms are unlikely to be successful, managers may use current 
innovations as a model by which to imitate.  By viewing the innovators as market leaders, 
managers in this firm may elect to adopt, thus increasing competition for resources.  
Little research exists on firms with weak or nonexistent capabilities as these 
organizations are apt to perish due to their competitive struggles.  
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2.2.2 Bundling and Deployment of Resources 
Discerning the type of capability possessed may not be an easy task for a 
manager.  In determining the proper course of action, a manager must consider the 
current bundling and deployment of resources.  While each type of capability may either 
enhance or inhibit the adoption of an innovation, the manager may be able to bundle or 
deploy the asset groupings in a different manner that allows for the creation of a different 
type of capability. 
For many firms, the modification of routines is the primary innovative activity.  
With the exception of technology firms possessing large research and development 
budgets, innovation occurs in the daily re-bundling and re-deployment of actors within a 
routine.  Changing these components helps generate new knowledge at the individual, 
social, and organizational level (Subramanian &Youndt, 2005; Holcolm, et al., 2009).  
Although this type of innovation may seem mundane, firms that are able to constantly 
imitate and improve routines can create significant amounts of new knowledge.  This 
“hidden,” intangible innovation is difficult to measure and quantify, but has led to 
significant advantages for those firms with capabilities in this area. 
As the core set of repeated firm activities, capabilities can also serve as a major 
function in innovation and organizational change.  While not all bundling and 
deployment constitutes innovation, the implementation of new ideas is seen through the 
routines in which the innovation is packaged.  New strategies emerge and new knowledge 
is formed as a result of this recombination.  The development of a successful series of 
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routines can evolve into an organizational capability, which can be seen as the strategic 
innovation. 
Academic research has focused on the usage of resources and the contexts in 
which bundling and deployment can create a competitive advantage.  Sirmon, et al. 
(2008) noted that the influence of managers is greater when resource stocks are similar.  
Grant (1996) argues that the primary capability of a firm is the ability to integrate 
knowledge (through bundling and deployment), specifically by using routines that 
capture tacit knowledge.  The success of this is partially dependent upon common 
knowledge (organizational), the frequency and variability of task performance 
(bundling), and structure (deployment) (Grant, 1996).   
 
2.3 Facilitators of Diffusion 
Whether developing new products or services, innovative companies can be seen 
as knowledge creating (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).  For this knowledge to be used, firms 
must find strategies for transferring the knowledge amongst their organization and to the 
marketplace.  Before an innovation can be marketed and ultimately replicated by 
competitors, the idea must pass through several levels of a firm, often times being 
transferred from one division to another.  In this manner, knowledge can serve as a 
facilitator of diffusion.  This section will explore the role of knowledge, both from the 
innovator and imitator, as a facilitator of diffusion.  
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2.3.1 Codified Knowledge 
The nature of the knowledge being transferred has been found to have an impact 
on diffusion throughout a firm and industry.  Knowledge defined as “sticky” can be seen 
as having high costs of acquisition, transfer, and use (von Hippel, 1994).  As these costs 
increase, transferring the knowledge becomes more difficult due to ties to a given 
location.  The knowledge may be inseparable from an individual or group of people or 
may require greater knowledge to understand the nuances of the idea.  This can 
simultaneously present challenges in bringing the innovation to market but provide 
advantages in preventing competitors from adopting a similar product or service.  When 
“sticky” information is encountered, firms tend to break up the knowledge into smaller 
pieces so that transfer is eased and information can be shared across different sites (von 
Hippel, 1994).  As the firm attempts to “break up” the knowledge, the codification 
process changes much of the knowledge from tacit to explicit.  Codifying the knowledge 
reduces the “stickiness” and facilitates transfer (Zander & Kogut, 1995).  Costs of 
stickiness can also be reduced through changes in causal ambiguity, an increase in the 
recipient’s absorptive capacity, a cooperative relationship between the knowledge holder 
and recipient, and prior success with the knowledge (Szulanski, 1996).  
Knowledge transfer can be seen as a separate and dyadic exchange rather than a 
steady flow of information spreading across a firm or industry.  As the knowledge is 
replicated, the transfer becomes a replication of an organizational routine rather than 
information incorporated into the knowledge base of a firm (Winter, 1995).  In using the 
innovator’s template, the imitator must replicate the business model and the non-
observable components of the innovation (Winter & Szulanski, 2001).  Even with both 
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components available, high levels of causal ambiguity may make duplication impossible.  
For this reason, firms with similar characteristics tend to mimic each other and learn from 
peer groups of allies and competitors (Darr & Kurtzberg, 2000).  Ironically, firms may 
have a difficult time recognizing when knowledge has been transferred from outside the 
organization and often fail to identify the sources of acquired knowledge (Argote & 
Ingram, 2000). 
 Despite the “stickiness” of the knowledge, firms may not be able to imitate 
another (or even themselves) due to the contextual facets of organizational capabilities 
(Teece, 1976).  Capabilities may be combinations of routines, actors, and processes that 
interact in such a manner that even the original firm cannot replicate the capability in 
different locations (Lippman & Rumelt, 1992).  The interaction of the capability-forming 
processes creates very specific circumstances under which knowledge creation and 
product output can occur.  Further, separating these routines can reduce the value of the 
entire capability (Teece & Pisano, 1994).  Ultimately, imitation and mimicry are risky 
processes requiring significant amounts of tacit knowledge, typically held by employees 
at the originating location.  
 
2.3.2 Adoption through hiring 
 Previous studies have analyzed methods of knowledge transfer through mimicry 
and imitation.  However, where information asymmetry and incentives to protect the 
knowledge are high, duplicating another firm’s knowledge structures may not be 
possible.  In this situation, many organizations have sought to tap into a firm’s knowledge 
through hiring employees from the innovator.  These individuals have first-hand 
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knowledge of the routines, processes, and strategies implemented to make the innovation 
a success.  While exact replication may not be possible, having access to the thought 
processes behind the innovation allows a firm the ability to tailor knowledge to their 
needs while simultaneously weakening a competitor.   
 Being able to recognize the value of an innovation, integrate it into an 
organization, and extrapolate profits are crucial skills for a firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990).  Although many innovations may not originate within a firm, the ability to use 
knowledge from others can allow a firm to remain competitive without devoting 
significant resources to innovation or taking unnecessary risks.  This exploitation of 
outside knowledge has been described as a firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990).  Similar to the borrowing of information from others (March & Simon, 
1958), absorptive capacity suggests that firms are better able to integrate new innovations 
if they have a broad base of related knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  An 
organization’s broad foundation of knowledge is developed through an assimilation of 
diverse individual capabilities (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).   
As a firm seems to build absorptive capacity or integrate new knowledge, they 
frequently look to hire outside employees that possess related capabilities to their own.  
When the source of the innovation lies in the heads of key employees, buying this 
knowledge through an employee transfer can help overcome network or implementation 
weaknesses (Rao & Drazin, 2002).  Recruitment of key employees can facilitate the 
exchange of new ideas (Baty et al., 1971) and reduce competitive advantage (Aime et al, 
2010).  This can help overcome challenges where the success of the innovation is 
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causally ambiguous or highly tacit (Barney, 1991).  New talent can also facilitate 
strategic changes and transition into new markets (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Dependent upon a firm’s needs, different types of knowledge can be sought from 
competitors.  Organizations seek to hire technical expertise when they seek to extend 
their current knowledge base in a non-core area (Song, et al., 2003).  This type of hire is 
also made to compensate for low quality resources in the area of technical expertise.  In 
this manner, the location of the new employee may signal the type of knowledge the 
imitator is seeking to access.  Technical learning through hiring is typical of a firm 
seeking to expand their horizons (Song, et al., 2003).  This is also thought to expand an 
organization’s absorptive capacity and serves as slack resources that enable the firm to 
take risks.  
Managers may also be hired if a competitor believes the individual is a source of 
the rival’s competitive advantage.  Research indicates that hiring a manager from a 
competitor can improve a firm’s performance vis-à-vis the competitor (Aime et al., 
2010).  Advantages can be reduced by removing a key source of a competitor’s 
knowledge, as well as through the replication of previously successful routines.  Learning 
by managerial hiring can also lead to the diffusion of an innovation by sharing previously 
protected knowledge with competitors.  However, this may lead to parity throughout the 
industry as advantages may not fully accrue to the hiring firm and may also be reduced 
by additional firms pursuing the same strategy.   
As illustrated by Aime, et al. (2010), hiring from a competitor can be beneficial 
when the talent acquiring firm is able to successfully pair the new manager with similar 
routines.  Through an analysis of coaches hired by NFL teams, the authors were able to 
 32 
 
demonstrate how socially complex routines became unstable after the departure of key 
employees and how advantages transferred to competitors who were able to matching 
their routines to newly hired personnel (Aime, et al., 2010).  While the authors did not 
differentiate between hiring with an intent to adopt an innovation, the transfer of 
knowledge is highlighted as a key component to routine stability and success. 
Unfortunately, little research is devoted to the transfer of lower level employees 
throughout organizations.  While these workers are charged with implementing 
innovations and interacting with key stakeholders, scant attention has been given to the 
impact of their departure or arrival.  Research is also unclear about firm performance 
upon hiring from competitors.  Although some findings indicate that a hiring firm will 
improve performance relative to the firm losing the manager, there is little evidence about 
a firm’s ability to increase market share or profitability based on these strategies.  
Further, studies have only looked at the hiring of one key employee and have scant 
empirical evidence to illustrate the effects of hiring multiple people.  Despite these open 
areas, hiring key technical experts or managers can help a firm gain additional knowledge 
at a faster rate than if they were to replicate the information on their own.  As a primary 
method of knowledge transfer and diffusion, firms continue to pursue this strategy to 
boost their knowledge stocks and shift market positions. 
 
2.3.3 Development of Capabilities 
While capabilities lead to increased efficiency and repetition, excessive stability 
of capabilities has been linked to inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1983) and competency 
traps (March, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988).  To prevent these problems from arising, 
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firms routinely evaluate and change key processes and actors.  As a function that 
encourages organizational learning (Levitt & March, 1988), this new knowledge that is 
integrated into firms may eventually lead an organization to develop additional 
capabilities and expertise.  Further, employees often change jobs and earn promotions, 
thus necessitating increased investment in capability development.   Thus the 
evolutionary aspect of replacing employees creates an opportunity to integrate new 
knowledge.   
 Firms that are consistently able to develop capabilities that create new products 
and processes to account for changing market conditions may have dynamic capabilities 
(Teece & Pisano, 1994).  Dynamic capabilities are the “adapting, integrating, and re-
configuring of internal and external organizational skills, resources, and functional 
competences towards the changing environment” (Teece & Pisano, 1994; p.1).  Dynamic 
capabilities can enhance a firm’s ability to adopt an innovation through the higher-order 
skill of facilitating change within the organization (Winter, 2002).  Organizations that 
possess dynamic capabilities respond favorably to radical innovations and can quickly 
adapt to the new competitive environment.   
 Dynamic capabilities also help firms avoid becoming myopic in response to 
environmental changes (Teece & Pisano, 1994; Levinthal & March, 1993).  Firms 
capable of acting quickly to market forces can avoid becoming path dependent upon their 
own resources.  By assimilating new information into the firm, management is able to 
deploy resources in numerous configurations that enhance the value of each asset.  
Successful development of dynamic capabilities must occur at the managerial level due to 
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the impact that an environmental change may have on the entire firm’s routines and 
capabilities (Teece & Pisano, 1994).   
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 This chapter outlines a proposed theoretical model of the strategic non-adoption 
of innovation.  A conceptual model is provided based on the given definitions of 
innovation, organizational capabilities, and knowledge transfer.  Then an outline of the 
theoretical arguments supporting the model is provided.  Finally, a set of testable 
hypotheses is included to explain the relationship between organizational capabilities, 
knowledge from the innovator, and firm performance. 
 
3.1 Hypotheses and Theoretical Model 
3.1.1 Empirical Model 
The model of innovation decision proposed by this study can be seen in Figure 1 below: 
Figure 1: Conceptual model of innovation adoption 
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The conceptual model illustrates the relationships between organizational 
capabilities, adoption of the innovation, knowledge from the innovator, and firm 
performance.  As highlighted, organizational capabilities will influence adoption 
decisions and moderate the relationship between adoption and firm performance.  
Adoption will lead to increased performance, but will be moderated by knowledge from 
the innovator.  Organizations that do not adopt will find their firm performance to be 
determined by the quality of their capabilities that do not directly relate to the innovation. 
Following previous definitions of innovation, this model assumes an innovation to 
be a “recombination of previously held knowledge” in a manner that is different from 
how the resources had been used by the innovator or competitors.  An organizational 
capability is defined as “a firm’s ability to perform repeatedly a productive task which 
relates either directly or indirectly to a firm’s capacity for creating value through 
effecting the transformation of inputs into outputs” (Grant, 1996: p. 377).  In this model, 
capabilities are the manifestation of a repeated, successful series of routines.  Knowledge 
from the innovator is conceptualized as the direct acquisition of knowledge about the 
innovation through the hiring of an individual with specific, tacit knowledge that could 
lead to the implementation of the innovation.  These definitions are used with the 
standard usage of firm performance to complete the model. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses on Adoption, Knowledge Transfer, and Performance 
As previously stated, innovation adoption decisions are driven by both internal 
and external forces, as firms commit once the economic or social benefits are perceived 
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to exceed the organization’s current position.  In this section, I suggest organizational 
capabilities as a unit of analysis for adoption decisions and propose that some firms 
should reject the innovation based on their current capabilities. 
Due to the benefits associated with innovation, prior literature has assumed 
adoption based on perceived economic and social gains (Rogers, 1995; Abrahamson, 
1991; Greve, 2011).  As firms weigh the efficacy of an innovation, they rationally adopt 
once the idea has proven to be profitable and the necessary resources can be acquired to 
implement the knowledge into their firm.  For firms that do adopt, these rational 
decisions have been explained by comparison to a reference group (Massini, et al, 2005), 
fads and fashions (Abrahamson, 1991; Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1990; Abrahamson & 
Rosenkopf; 1993), risk aversion (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006), and robust social networks 
(Greve, 1998).  However, despite greater emphasis being placed on looking inside of the 
firm (Barney, 1991; Sirmon et al, 2007; Penrose, 1959), little research has explored how 
a firm makes adoption decisions based on their resources and capabilities. 
The unit of analysis for the following hypotheses is the firm capabilities, 
measured in relation to the innovation.  Only those capabilities that are pertinent to the 
implementation of the innovation will be considered.  As illustrated in the model above, 
once adoption decisions are made, firm performance is compared and moderated by the 
strength of the capabilities and the ability to access knowledge from the innovator. 
Although several studies have illustrated capability development in innovation 
and knowledge integration, most tend to assume that firms have the ability to bundle and 
deploy firm resources in a manner that produces a successful adoption (Kogut & Zander, 
1995).  Although this may be the case, this excludes the cost of shifting resources and 
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developing new capabilities and disregards the possibility that a firm may find greater 
success by rejecting in the innovation.  Embedded in these capabilities is the need for 
various resources, actors, and activities (Teece & Pisano, 1994; Winter 2000; Winter, 
2002).  The ability to adopt the innovation will be dependent upon the adopting firm’s 
current knowledge stocks, capabilities, and desired outcomes. 
Capabilities can both enhance or inhibit the adoption of an innovation.  
Recognizing that numerous capabilities were needed to commercialize an innovation, 
Teece (1986) illustrates the need to possess complementary capabilities.  A 
complementary capability is an asset whose presence is needed to fully capitalize on the 
value of another (Teece, 1986; Winter 2006; Milgrom & Roberts, 1995).  The presence of 
the complementary capability increases the marginal value of the original asset 
(Rothaermel & Hess, 2007).  Although these can be other parts to a larger system, 
complementary capabilities can frequently be found in support areas such as marketing, 
sales support or technical support.  Complementary capabilities tend to be specialized in 
nature, as generic assets do not need to be tailored to support the innovation (Teece, 
1986).   
Firms with these complementary capabilities may provide an imitating firm with 
the ability to capture the advantages derived from another’s innovation (Teece, 1986; 
Winter, 2006).  Although one firm may possess greater innovative capabilities, the ability 
to commercialize the idea may be limited by the organization’s assets.  These assets can 
be technical or social but help facilitate the ability to distribute and market the product.   
The supply of complementary capabilities cannot be assumed to be universal 
(Winter, 2006).  Since firms cannot know in advance what innovations will be produced, 
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either by their organization or competitors, competition ensues for the imitative and 
complementary assets.  In some cases, the innovator will already possess several of the 
complementary capabilities and is thus afforded the opportunity to limit the market for 
this knowledge (Winter, 2006; Teece, 1986).  However, the knowledge protecting these 
capabilities may be subject to patent or other legal protection, thereby limiting the 
accessibility of both the innovation and the necessary complements.  If the innovator does 
not possess the needed capabilities, increased competition will exist for both resources, 
potentially leaving the innovator without financial gain for their efforts (Teece, 1986; 
Winter 2006).  For these reasons, hypothesis 1 is given below: 
 
H1: The adoption of the innovation will be positively correlated with complementary 
capabilities.  
 
In an environment where competition is fierce for innovative and complementary 
capabilities, organizations may turn to substitutive capabilities for support.  Whereas 
complementary capabilities work in conjunction with different processes and functions 
within a firm, substitutive capabilities replace different links within the 
commercialization process (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011; Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; 
Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006).  Due to the substitution effects, the replacing of one 
capability must marginally decrease the overall productivity when compared to a 
complementary capability (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011).  However, the overall 
combination of assets and capabilities allows the firm to successfully imitate an 
innovation, bringing to market an idea that benefits the organization.   
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 Substitutive capabilities can be seen in many industries through traditional make 
or buy decisions.  In the pharmaceutical industry, organizations have chosen differing 
methods of creating advantages in the development of medicine.  Merck has taken the 
approach of developing research capabilities internally, investing in scientists and 
equipment to produce their own patented drug.  In contrast, Eli Lilly has approached the 
same goal through acquisition of and alliances with competitors (Rothaermel & Hess, 
2007).  As a substitutive capability to research, Eli Lilly has developed an ability to 
integrate outside knowledge into a broader organizational structure.  Each company also 
possesses complementary capabilities that enable the respective strategies to exist.  
However, in regards to pharmaceutical innovation, the two firms have substitutive 
capabilities (Rothaermel & Hess, 2007). 
 Firms with substitutive capabilities have the potential to adopt an innovation but 
do so with greater risk.  By using currently held capabilities, the organization is removed 
from competition for complementary assets, but must compete with assets whose 
marginal value is lower (Rothaermel & Hess, 2007).  Firms with substitutive capabilities 
are unlikely to be early adopters of an innovation, but still find efficacy in implementing 
the new idea (Rogers, 1995).  The decreased potential to profit deters immediate 
imitation from substitution, though firms are not faced with the same market pressures to 
adopt as those employing complementary capabilities (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; 
Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006).  However, despite the challenges, firms with substitutive 
capabilities can still benefit from adoption by using similar assets to accomplish the 
outcomes of the innovation.  Oriented in the same direction as firms with complementary 
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capabilities, these organizations are still able to absorb the risk of redeploying assets.  
Due to the potential for usage of substitutive capabilities: 
 
H2:  Adoption of the innovation will be positively correlated with firms possessing 
substitutive capabilities.  
 
Differing strategic decisions and resources may lead a firm to possess neutralizing 
capabilities in relation to the innovation.  As Barney (1991) explains, resources can create 
value through their ability to neutralize a threat within the firm’s environment.  In some 
cases, this ability is more valuable or rare than those that exploit market opportunities.  If 
the threat is persistent, the development of these threat neutralizing resources can lead to 
a neutralizing capability.  As an innovation is, by definition, a threat to the status quo of 
competition, neutralizing capabilities can be effective in negating the effects of an 
innovation (Schumpeter, 1939; Porter, 1980). 
 Just as back office functions can serve to complement the commercialization of an 
innovation, they can also allow competitors to neutralize the threat.  Capabilities in 
marketing, customer service and information technology can thwart an innovation 
through direct interaction with customers, suppliers, or competitors.   
The development of capabilities includes many managerial decisions over time as 
firms build resources towards the pursuit of a given strategy.  As time progresses, future 
choices become path dependent upon the available resources and the high costs of 
reacquiring and deploying new asset groups (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  As firms acquire 
knowledge and capabilities, they become locked into the advantages and disadvantages 
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that these assets provide.  This can both help and hinder a firm’s ability to adapt to 
changes in the competitive environment.  Organizations are able to derive advantages 
from their capabilities through constant usage and learn from repetition of the routines 
and processes (Levitt & March, 1988).  As an innovation disrupts the competitive 
environment, firms are incentivized to incorporate the new idea into their current 
capabilities.  However, a superior innovation in one firm may not be advantageous in 
others.  This is due to the difficulty in replicating resources and bundling knowledge in a 
repeatable fashion (Teece & Pisano, 1994).  Further, adopting an innovation may cause a 
firm to withdraw from an advantageous position obtained from their current bundling and 
deployment of resources.  Due to the high risks of adoption and the necessity to acquire a 
different set of capabilities: 
 
H3: Firms with neutralizing capabilities to those of an innovator will be less likely to 
adopt the innovation than those who possess substitutive and complementary capabilities. 
 
Due to the role of improvisation and determination of decision points within a 
routine, an adopting organization will find difficulty in reverse engineering the innovative 
capabilities (Teece & Pisano, 1994; Winter, 2002; Winter & Szulanski, 2001; Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003).  The costs of investigating where decision points lie and what the 
potential options may be will be prohibitive of imitation and developing a capability 
without accessing direct knowledge of the innovation (Rao & Drazin, 2002; Baty, et al., 
1971; Aime, et al., 2010).  The scarcity of this information is another factor that firms 
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considering imitation might consider.  Firms that are able to access this information will 
benefit from a streamlined implementation and greater performance. 
 In an attempt to bypass the difficulties with reengineering the innovation, firms 
may elect to access knowledge of the idea through hiring key employees from the 
innovator (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007).  These employees 
bring the tacit knowledge necessary to pass along to assist in an adoption decision.  Firms 
may also hire key innovator employees to gain access to the innovation in an attempt to 
further develop neutralizing routines.  While these employees may be in high demand, 
the benefits from accessing their knowledge are explained below: 
 
H4: Due to the complex nature of strategic innovations, knowledge from the originating 
firm will moderate the relationship between adoption of the innovation and firm 
performance for firms with complementary and substitutive capabilities.  
 
Since direct knowledge of the innovation is scarce and expensive, firms with 
neutralizing capabilities may better served by continuing to devote resources to their 
current capabilities rather than pursuing the innovation.  Despite previous theories of 
inevitable adoption, non-adopting firms with capabilities that neutralize the strategic 
innovation have the potential to achieve higher performance outcomes than similar firms 
that do adopt.  However, firms that possess complementary or substitutive capabilities 
represent a class of capabilities that are typically defined as eventual adopters.  In the 
meantime, performance of non-adopters with neutralizing capabilities will exceed that of 
the other non-adopters.  
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Despite the potential for neutralizing threats to serve as a slack resource while the 
firm gathers the necessary resources to adopt, market competition dictates that the 
resources may shift to where they provide the most value (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; 
Rottenberg, 1956; Coase, 1960).  For this reason, knowledge of the innovation will tend 
to shift towards firms intent on immediate adoption.  Although firms with neutralizing 
capabilities can still bid for these resources, they may have to pay a premium, while 
simultaneously diverting attention from areas in which they have superior capabilities.   
The development and deployment of neutralizing capabilities can eliminate the 
need for adoption.  Firms that do not adopt the innovation may be devoting resources to 
the development of neutralizing capabilities.  Instead of seeking a homogenous set of 
resources, these firms bundle and deploy resources in a manner that reduces the 
innovation’s advantage.  However, the efficiency of the innovation will gradually reduce 
the benefits from complementary and substitutive capabilities.  Firms will be forced to 
develop capabilities that capitalize on neutralizing resources or integrate elements of the 
adoption into their organization.  The usage and success of these neutralizing capabilities 
will be sustainable as long as the quality of the resources does not depreciate.  There will 
not be a need to adopt the innovation.  Due to the use of complementary and substitutive 
capabilities, as well as the increased ability of neutralizing capability firms to access 
capability strengthening resources: 
 
H5a:  Adopting firms with complementary capabilities will achieve greater performance 
than non-adopting firms with complementary capabilities.  
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H5b:  Adopting firms with substitutive capabilities will achieve greater performance than 
non-adopting firms with substitutive capabilities. 
 
H5c:  Non-adopting firms with neutralizing capabilities will achieve greater performance 
than adopting firms with neutralizing capabilities. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
 In this chapter, I present the methodology that was used to test the hypotheses 
listed in Chapter 3 and provide answers to the previously stated research questions.  First, 
I will explain the sample used in the analysis and highlight why this represents an 
important innovation.  I then define the variables and end with a discussion of the 
regression equations used to test the hypotheses.   
 
4.1 Research Sample 
The innovation diffusing pattern selected for this dissertation is the West Coast 
Offense in the National Football League (NFL), which has been identified as one the 
most influential innovations in professional football (Jaworski, 2010).  The combination 
of plays and decision points within the offense can be seen as a routine.  Credited to 
former San Francisco 49ers head coach Bill Walsh, the offense was revolutionary in the 
creation of a routine that involved a passing attack with the ability to negate the defense’s 
pressure on the quarterback and consolidate defenders around the scrimmage line.  Other 
key contributions of this innovation include changing the attributes necessary to play 
quarterback and wide receiver, opening up the positions to allow players with a variety of 
different skills to succeed through the system.  The offense was also innovative through 
the combination of plays using a horizontal passing game that spread the defense from 
one sideline to another as well as through the length of the field (Jaworski, 2010).  As the 
head coach, Walsh and his staff developed these sets of plays, or routines, by bundling 
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and deploying similar resources in a different manner.  Through repetition and constant 
evaluation, the 49ers developed a capability in implementing the West Coast Offense.   
While running Walsh’s system, the San Francisco 49ers had the best record of any 
team in the National Football League and won five Super Bowl championships.  The 
endurance of the West Coast Offense’s success is illustrated by the number of 
organizations currently running the system.  Ten NFL teams currently run the offense, 
including two of the previous four Super Bowl champions (Green Bay Packers, 2010; 
New Orleans Saints 2009). 
 The sample population for this study was drawn from all professional football 
teams starting with the 1980 season.  This is one year after Bill Walsh began coaching in 
San Francisco, thus representing the first opportunity competitors would have had to 
imitate the success of the offense.  While the San Francisco 49ers did not achieve high 
levels of team success until 1981, other teams could have already identified routine 
patterns and combinations.  The sample continues through the conclusion of the 2011 
season, the most recent completed season when data analysis commenced.  In total, this 
represents 32 years of data with between 28 and 32 teams competing in each season.  The 
total number of team seasons represented in the sample is 981.  These data signify the 
entirety of professional football organizations and performances since the creation of the 
West Coast Offense.  However, while this is an entire population, the analysis will be 
conducted as a sample since the theory and conclusions attempt to generalize to larger 
populations of innovations and firms in other industries. 
 Data for performance variables was obtained through the website www.pro-
football-reference.com for team performance variables.  The website is a database of 
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statistics tracked by team, player, and season.  Data is available for every single game, 
coach, and player in NFL history.  To ensure accuracy of recording, statistics were 
downloaded directly from the website.  No statistical information was manually recorded.  
Prior to conducting analysis, figures were rechecked to ensure accurate transfer from the 
website.  Standard deviations and other performance metrics were then calculated to 
provide a deeper look at team output over time.   
 Information about imitation and implementation of the West Coast Offense was 
obtained primarily through research of the NFL archives at the Professional Football Hall 
of Fame in Canton, OH.  With assistance from full-time researchers at the Hall of Fame, 
historical records were examined including media guides, newspaper articles, team and 
league publications, books, and biographies of key personnel involved in this era of 
football.  Based on information found in these sources, as well as conversations with the 
research staff, team strategies and routines were identified and classified as an imitator of 
the West Coast Offense.  Classification was made based on direct comments by team 
personnel stating an intention to run the offense, references to the coach’s desire for a 
“west coast” system, descriptions of routines and similar resource deployment, the usage 
of “west coast” terminology in describing routines, and the background or coaching 
philosophy of the staff.  The final list of teams running the West Coast Offense was given 
to the Hall of Fame research staff for a final review.  The researchers cross-verified the 
teams and found teams all on the list to be accurately categorized as adopters or non-
adopters of the West Coast Offense. 
Although the 49ers’ team performance is included in the annual statistical 
calculations, 49er offenses were not considered to be part of the sample given that they 
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were an innovator rather than imitator.  As the team moved to a different system in 2004, 
these squads were included in the non-adopter category.  Excluding these San Francisco 
teams, the sample includes a total of 254 team seasons where the West Coast Offense was 
implemented. 
Although there are many individuals within a professional football firm that may 
help dictate the on-field strategy and routines, the primary responsibility lies with the 
head coach.  The owner and general manager may elect to hire a coach due to their 
familiarity with a given strategy (and therefore expect that the strategy be implemented) 
but these executives are removed from the teaching and designing of the system.  The 
head coach is in charge of hiring assistant coaches, typically specific to a unit of players 
(offense, defense, special teams) or position (linebackers, offensive line, running backs, 
etc.).  At times, a head coach may delegate strategic responsibilities to an assistant coach 
with more expertise in a given area.  For the purposes of this study, the background of the 
head coach and offensive coordinator were examined to determine prior experience and 
knowledge with the West Coast Offense. 
This type of sample provides distinct advantages for strategy research.  First, the 
longitudinal nature of the dataset allows for analysis over time at the firm and industry 
level.  Additionally, the specificity of firm performance data allows for firms and their 
personnel to be accurately measured over time.  The importance of the coach and the 
easily identifiable skills of players (evidenced through playing statistics) create 
discernible start and end dates to the implementation of various strategies.  Second, 
unlike many other innovation studies, adoption and non-adoption of strategies can be 
easily identified.  From this, performance can be compared and resources measured to 
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reveal influences of managerial decision making.  As all firms within this study are single 
service producers, firm boundaries are fixed and impact of adoption on other units can be 
ignored.  This group of firms is also relatively stable over the course of the sample set, 
with only four firms being added to the league and zero firms being removed.  While 
there are a handful of organizations that relocate during the thirty year time period, the 
primary employees (coaches, players, executives) relocated with the team and maintained 
their positions in the new city.  Finally, the consistency of seasons and strategic decisions 
allows for natural time intervals within the data set.  Changing routines and strategic 
direction are activities pursued by teams during the offseason through coaching and 
player changes.  The importance of the NFL draft and free agency in acquiring players 
provides an opportunity to reassess routines.  Although coaching changes are made in the 
middle of a season, these interim coaches are typically not given the authority (nor is time 
available) to redesign the organizational routines.  Each offseason teams evaluate the 
performance of their strategic routines and can change based on the hiring or firing of the 
head coach, assistant coaches, or players.  This creates a distinct point of innovation 
adoption that is supported through statistics and observation of the routines. 
In addition to the characteristics listed above, the usage of sport samples leads to 
several other advantages in measurement and theory development.  Other scholars have 
found similar sport samples to be useful in assessing group tacit knowledge (Berman, et 
al. 2002), managerial deployment of resources (Sirmon, et al, 2009), and strategic human 
resources (Wright, et al. 1995).  These samples are valuable due to the resource 
homogeneity of the firms and the similarity of firm goals.  As rosters are limited to the 
same number of players across all of professional football, advantages of size can be 
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disregarded.  Further, financial advantages are limited due to the high degree of revenue 
sharing stemming from national television contracts and gate receipts (Borland & 
Macdonald, 2003).  The objectivity of performance data (winning football games) 
indicates that all firms are proceeding towards the same goal, absent of any complicating 
factors.   
As a laboratory for innovation research, the context is particularly interesting due 
to the availability of information competitors receive about resources and strategy.  With 
each contest being televised to a national audience, including consumers and competitors, 
information about strategic innovations is freely available for all to see.  The quality of 
the strategy is immediately apparent, while reverse engineering of the strategy is possible 
through viewing the implementation.  Further, innovation research in a professional sport 
setting is enhanced through the zero sum game inherent to sporting contests.  Since not 
all firms within an industry can achieve high performance, the competitive dynamics 
provide significant incentives promoting innovation and quickly adopting successful 
strategies.  These characteristics have led many to conclude that the NFL is a “copycat 
league” (Jaworski, 2010). 
 
4.2 Professional Football 
 Professional football is an American game featuring distinct units of eleven 
offensive and defensive players competing at a time.  The goal of the game is to advance 
the ball from one end of the field to another, crossing a goal line or kicking the ball 
through uprights to earn points.  Teams are allowed to advance the ball by running or 
throwing the ball, with the opposing team stopping the advancement through a tackle or 
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an incomplete pass.  Each tackle or incomplete pass ends the play and the teams are 
required to set up and try again.  Possession of the ball is exchanged when a team loses 
the ball through a fumble or interception or when failing in four plays to advance the ball 
a total distance of ten yards.  As such, offense and defense play an equal role with teams 
having the option to devote resources in any manner necessary to each.  Players typically 
compete either on the offensive or defensive “unit,” with little to no crossover between 
the two.  Skills are highly specialized, such that individuals are assigned one position and 
typically do not drift to other roles.  The game is played in a series of “downs” where 
each team is allowed to decide personnel and set up a formation consistent with the goals 
of the down. 
 Football is a valuable setting for understanding numerous theories of strategic 
management and has been used to examine resources and explain transfer of key 
employees (Smart & Wolfe, 2000; Wolfe, et al, 2005; Aime, et al, 2010).  The study of 
innovation within football is particularly valuable given the structure of the game.  With a 
coach (i.e. manager) installing and choosing plays, the strategic decisions are made at the 
broad level (i.e. what strategies to adopt) and at the tactical level (which plays to run 
against a given opponent).  The role of a football coach is similar to that of a manager of 
a large professional service firm, as the primary role is to determine the appropriate 
bundling and deployment of resources given various constraints.  Throughout the history 
of the sport, numerous innovations have radically changed the game including the toss 
sweep, the vertical passing game, the Cover 2 defense, the zone blitz, and the West Coast 
Offense (Jaworski, 2010).   
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4.3 Innovation of the West Coast Offense 
In 1978, the year before Walsh was hired in San Francisco, two rule changes by 
the NFL paved the way for greater influence of the passing game.  First, rules were 
modified to prevent defensive backs from making contact with receivers beyond the first 
five yards of the play.  This made utilization of receiver’s skills a more palatable strategic 
option since offenses no longer had to worry about receivers being bumped off their route 
before the ball could be thrown.  The second rule change allowed offensive linemen 
greater latitude in using their hands in pass blocking.  This change allowed blockers to 
extend their arms and use their hands to keep defenders away from the quarterback.  With 
these new guidelines, linemen were able to give their quarterbacks more time and space 
to scan the field and decide where to throw the football (NFL Rulebook). 
As the most popular passing-centric offense of the era, the vertical game credited 
to Don Coryell was significantly more aggressive than the West Coast Offense.  In this 
system, quarterbacks were coached to attempt risky passes in an effort to score on a big 
play and not to be concerned about incomplete passes (Layden, 2011).  In contrast, the 
West Coast Offense sought to complete a high percentage of short throws in an effort to 
control the ball and flow of the game.  The conservatism of this strategy prevented the 
opponent from hitting the quarterback and forcing substitutions of reserve players.  
Walsh’s system also provided the quarterback with a series of progressions that were 
designed to produce uncertainty within the defense as to where the ball would be thrown.  
Since the quarterback would have multiple options on a given play, the defense had to 
respect the abilities of all potential receivers.  Further, the West Coast Offense was the 
first to institute a “hot” receiver or one that was sent to the voided area by a blitzing 
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linebacker (Layden, 2011).  This combination of decision points was highly innovative 
for the time period and many of the innovations are incorporated into most current NFL 
offenses.  While the talents of the players are certainly a factor in both offenses, Walsh’s 
system required a different set of skills to be successful.   
The capabilities involved in the West Coast Offense also differ from other 
offenses in the number of decision points where players must make simultaneous, 
coordinated movements.  As opposed to other offenses of the era, the West Coast Offense 
featured greater degrees of improvisation as each team lines up to begin a play.  
Depending on how the defense is aligned, each of the eleven offensive players must make 
adjustments to blocking schemes, pass routes, and the direction of the play.  Although the 
quarterback is in charge of calling out the play, this set of routines also dictates that 
players make autonomous decisions during the play based on defensive movements.  The 
coordination of this process requires significant amounts of practice and knowledge co-
created by the coaches and players.  Inherent in the knowledge requirements for running 
the offense is a high degree of individual and group tacit knowledge.  This can only be 
obtained through exposure to the philosophies and repetition gained through practice.  
The introduction of greater in-play improvisation created the demand for strategy specific 
tacit knowledge and is, perhaps, the most significant contribution from the West Coast 
Offense.  As a result of increasing the number of decision points, teams would also begin 
increasing the amount of responsibility given to defenders to improvise before and during 
plays.  The effect of greater improvisation and increasing decision points is a set of 
routines that is more difficult to defend and imitate.  Each of these attributes helped give 
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the 49ers a sustained competitive advantage in running the West Coast Offense under Bill 
Walsh and his successors. 
Despite the increasing popularity of passing offenses, the performance of the San 
Francisco 49ers while utilizing the West Coast Offense was remarkable.  While one of 
the worst performing organizations in the decade of the 1970s, the team won the Super 
Bowl (league championship) a total of five times after implementing the system.  The 
49ers possessed the NFL’s best record during this time period, spanning almost a quarter 
century (Pro Football Reference).   The core of the first several championship teams was 
built by Walsh under severe constraints due to a lack of high draft picks forfeited to other 
teams in ill-fated trades prior to his tenure.  Anecdotally and empirically, the West Coast 
Offense proved to be a revolutionary method of scoring points and constructing a team.  
Over the course of the sample, teams running the West Coast Offense possess a 
statistically significant difference from all other offenses in the number of points scored 
per game.  See Table 1 below for further information: 
 
Table 1: Points scored by offense categorization 
 West Coast Offense Teams Non-WCO Teams F-Stat 
Points Scored 349.57 321.02 28.267* 
* Difference in offensive production is significant at the 0.000 level 
 
Assessments on the payroll of teams across the entirety of the sample cannot be 
known given the privately held information and lack of salary cap until the early 1990s.  
However, the vast majority of the adoption occurred after the cap was implemented and 
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free agency began.  While teams may have had incentive to significantly boost their 
payroll during adoption, the lack of adoption prior to the salary limitations suggests that 
few teams pursued this option.  Additionally, when the 49ers created the innovation, they 
were handicapped by a lack of draft picks as a result of ill-fated trades made by previous 
team managers.  As a result, they were developing the new system without one avenue to 
access talented players. 
During the evolution of the West Coast Offense, the National Football League 
had many restrictions in place that prevented the flow of resources from one team to 
another.  Among the most basic restriction is a limit in the roster size.  Since the early 
1980’s, football rosters have been capped at between 45 and 47 players who are eligible 
to play in a given game.  To account for injuries and player development, up to 53 
players are allowed to be under contract.  This prevents the hoarding of resources and 
requires team architects to balance resource acquisition amongst offensive, defensive, and 
special team players.  Since the game requires equal numbers of offensive and defensive 
players, a roster may have higher quality resources in one area but would be forced to 
commit roster spots to lesser talented players in other areas.   
The primary means of acquiring new assets is the amateur draft.  Held each year, 
the draft allows each team to select first year players from the amateur ranks based on the 
prior year’s order of finish.  The lowest performing teams receive the first choices of 
amateurs.  The length of the draft has varied over time, ranging from the average 
distribution of between 7 and 12 new players per team.  Once drafted, players are only 
able to play for the team that selects them.  The first purpose in using this structure is to 
allocate new talent amongst the teams.  The second purpose is to decrease competition, 
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and therefore compensation, for new resources.  As teams possess exclusive negotiating 
rights and other top professional football leagues do not exist, market power shifts to the 
teams who thereby, pay below a market rate to acquire new talent.  Draft strategies 
include selection of players with specific talents, those who are familiar with a given 
philosophy or system, and based on the reputation of their college or university.   
The other method of acquiring new resources is through free agency.  This system 
is included in collective bargaining between the players’ union and management and 
failed to exist prior to the 1993 season.  Up until this point, teams retained exclusive 
control of the player’s ability to play in the National Football League.  Unless the team 
relinquished that control by cutting the player from their roster, the player could not 
choose his preferred team.  The end result is that high quality resources were rarely 
subjected to the market and did not move from one organization to another.  While this 
helped to maintain competitive advantages, as with the amateur draft, another benefit for 
management was the depression of salaries.  If a team was successful in acquiring and 
developing talent, there was no concern that the talent would depart to become employed 
by a competitor.   
 Although the NFL has changed over the past 32 years, the West Coast offense has 
stood the test of time.  In comparison to other strategies of the era, the West Coast 
Offense is truly revolutionary for the usage of spacing, timing and improvisation.  These 
two elements can be seen in much of the present day schemes in most offenses and 
defenses.  As the system has modernized, these elements have evolved as well, such that 
the West Coast Offense is still an effective attack.  The system of routines efficiently 
advances the ball down the field, while allowing for a conservative passing game.  High 
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quality resources still provide advantages with this offense, but individuals with less 
value in other systems can prosper in the West Coast Offense if they are able to master 
the design concepts. 
 
4.4 Measurement of Research Variables 
 The following outline describes the type and definition of variables that will be 
analyzed in this study: 
 
4.4.1 Dependent Variables 
Innovation Adoption. The adoption of the West Coast Offense was measured 
through a binary variable recording whether or not the team implemented the innovation 
during a given season.  At the end of each season, teams assess the effectiveness of their 
strategies, create new ones, and adopt successful strategies and capabilities from other 
organizations.  As coaching staffs and players move amongst teams, knowledge about 
different tactics and strategies diffuses throughout the league.  With this knowledge 
shifting constantly, adoption of the West Coast Offense is measurable on an annual basis.  
Each team’s adoption classification was dependent upon a review of the organization’s 
annual media guide, historical books, newspaper clippings, coaching staff, playing 
personnel, analysis of plays, and discussions with staff at the Professional Football Hall 
of Fame.  Support for each classification was corroborated through a multiple of the 
sources previously listed.  
Organizational Performance.  Success of organizations was measured by the 
point differential for each season.  This variable has been used in numerous management 
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studies as a measure of team quality (Berman, et al, 2002; Holcomb, et al, 2009; Wolfe, 
et al, 2005).  This figure, representing the difference between points scored and points 
allowed, is a better representation of team quality than win-loss record based on the small 
number of games in a season (16), the degree of luck involved in winning a close game, 
and the difference in schedule strength amongst teams.  Point differential also possesses 
more variance, thus allowing for a more accurate differentiation amongst teams.  This 
spread is also consistent over time, with similar point differentials suggesting teams of 
equivalent strength, beyond year-specific trends in scoring or defense.  Further, this 
variable has a mean value of zero for a given season, allowing for simple comparisons 
across organizations.  Playoff games were not considered in the dataset due to the varying 
number completed by each team.   
The usage of point differentials considers the deployment of resources throughout 
the organization, rather than simply on the offensive side of the ball.  In comparison to 
simply using points scored, point differential more fairly represents the realities of team 
construction.  While the innovation specifically refers to offense, adopting and 
contributing resources at the expense of the defense would decrease overall team 
performance, thus negating any advantages gained.  Finally, competition in professional 
football represents a zero sum game, where an advantage gained by one organization 
results in an equal and opposite disadvantage to a competitor.  This increases the 
incentives to adopt an innovation or create a new system. 
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4.4.2 Independent Variables 
Complementary Capabilities.  Complementary routines are defined as those that 
are similar to the innovation in question.  For a professional football team, passing 
routines would be complementary to the West Coast Offense.  Although several passing 
strategies were prevalent at the onset of Walsh’s offense, passing teams possessed the key 
resources to adopt the innovation.  Strategically, other passing offenses may be riskier or 
designed around different talents; however, the shift from this strategy is closer than any 
other construction of a football team.  For these organizations, the routines may differ, 
but the team resources and philosophy are similar.  The measurement of complementary 
capabilities was the team’s number of passing yards accumulated during the season.  This 
statistical measure of a team’s passing performance was measured as the number of 
standard deviations from the league leader in passing yards. 
 
Substitutive Capabilities.  Organizations with substitutive capabilities are those 
whose routines seek to accomplish the same task as competitors but with different links 
in the process.  Applying this definition to professional football, teams that have a routine 
strength in running the football are defined as having a substitutive routine.  As teams 
develop offensive schemes, the option to run or pass is substitutive as only one can be 
performed on each play.  The goal of each is the exact same, that is, to advance the ball 
down the field and score points.  All things being equal, a team would be indifferent as to 
running or passing.  However, each requires a different set of routines and skills to be 
successful.  A running team would place greater reliance on larger and stronger offensive 
linemen and tight ends, with fewer resources devoted to a quarterback or wide receivers.  
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Running capabilities are considered to be equal and opposite of those found in the West 
Coast Offense.  Although teams can succeed at both running and passing, organizations 
primarily construct routines with the strength of one in mind.  The running capabilities of 
NFL teams was measured through the number of rushing yards accumulated during the 
season.  To account for long term, league-wide trends, the unit of analysis used was the 
team’s number of standard deviations from the league leader in rushing. 
 
Neutralizing Capabilities.  In contrast, neutralizing capabilities are those that 
reduce the value created by the innovation.  In the context of professional football, a 
defensive strength represents a set of strategic capabilities that mitigate an offense’s 
ability to score points.  Other neutralizing capabilities consist of an organization’s ability 
to change the value proposition of a product or service in a manner that emphasizes their 
capability strength.  If a team has a neutralizing capability (a strong defense) they may be 
less inclined to adopt the West Coast Offense if they believe that their defense (or others 
that are similar) has the ability to eliminate advantages derived from the system.  
Organizations in this position may perceive the potential for gains from adoption to be 
lower based on knowledge of their resource deployments.  Neutralizing capabilities were 
measured through the strength of the defense, as demonstrated by the number of yards 
allowed during a season.  Statistics were evaluated in relation to the league leader, with 
the distance in standard deviations being the quantification of this variable. 
To measure each of the independent variables listed below, data was compiled for 
each team in a given season.  Standard deviations were calculated based on the distance 
from league leaders each season.  As deviations are calculated to measure the strength of 
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teams, the number of standard deviations from the league leader is used to represent the 
relative performance of each team with regards to the rest of the league.  League leaders 
are used to represent how an organization would perceive their resources and strengths 
relative to competitors.  
To ensure that the league schedule and injuries do not impact the classification of 
a team’s strength, a three year weighted lag was recorded for each organization.  To 
replicate an organization’s adoption decision, the previous year is given a weight of one, 
two years prior are weighted at .667 and three years prior at .333.  Three years represents 
the average tenure of a player over the length of the dataset.  As players are the key 
resource that executes the routines, significant turnover in player personnel could have a 
dramatic impact on an organization’s routine strength and ability to pursue a given 
strategy. 
A central issue for predicting the adoption of innovative routines, including the 
West Coast Offense, is recognizing where the team’s strengths lie.  Offensive and 
defensive strengths can be evaluated based on the relative strength of each unit within 
one team and in comparison to other teams.  Within an offense, a team can be successful 
by either running or passing the ball.  As each play represents a tradeoff between these 
two options, strategies are devised to take advantage of an offense’s talents at each.  
Therefore, strong offensive teams can be classified as those with a running or passing 
strength.  Conversely, defenses are reactive in nature to what the opposing offense runs.  
Teams do not have the freedom of choice to strategically specialize in defending the run 
or pass, as an opponent will simply revert to the other in an attempt to advance the ball.  
With these three scenarios, a given team’s strength was identified by the standard 
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deviation closest to the league leader.  Exceptional teams are likely to have all three areas 
above the league average, but only one area is recognized due to its strategic importance.  
Just as a firm may have multiple successful product lines, only one is typically perceived 
as the organization’s strength. 
 As organizations make decisions about adopting new strategies and innovations, 
they are likely to consider the strength of the team both currently and over recent history.  
If an organization has been successful using their current routines, they may view a 
change in routines as a risky proposition.  Player performance and talent is captured 
through the number of deviations from the league leader in a given area.  Given these 
factors, a team was identified as having a strength in running, passing, or defense based 
on being in the top quartile of standard deviations from the league leader over the three 
year period (though not necessarily in each of the three).  This is consistent with previous 
studies that suggest that firms look to a reference group when making adoption decisions 
(Massini, et al., 2005).  Within professional football, all organizations are approximately 
the same size and all have a similar goal, thus the league leader within a particular 
capability serves as the reference group.  Taking the top quartile is a conservative 
measurement to ensure that all teams with potential strengths in each area are considered.  
Teams beyond this demarcation are not perceived as having a unit strong enough to 
influence the adoption of an innovation.  Organizations were defined as having a 
complementary, substitutive, or neutralizing routine based on the set of routines that 
performed the best relative to competitors.  For example, an organization registering 0.5 
standard deviations from the league leader in passing and 0.25 deviations in defense is 
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said to have strength in neutralizing routines.  In total, this method represents a snapshot 
of how management would view the team’s ability to adopt an innovation. 
 
Knowledge Acquisition from the Innovator.  Given the high number of 
decision points and variation in bundling and deployment of the strategy, recreating the 
innovation without input from the original source may be difficult.  Direct knowledge of 
the innovation may help mitigate these problems.  Within professional football, direct 
knowledge is held by offensive coaches that directly worked for the San Francisco 49ers 
while the team ran the West Coast Offense and were considered to have access to the 
original innovation.  This was recorded as a binary variable of having access or no access 
to information about the innovation.  Although players would have access to similar 
knowledge, they would not be in charge of making strategic decisions about which 
system to deploy or how to bundle resources.  Further, they would only be exposed to the 
decision points of their position, rather than the entire offense.  While hiring players with 
knowledge of the West Coast Offense could help an organization adopt the innovation, 
their knowledge would not be sufficient to instruct the other coaches and players on the 
entirety of the strategy.   
Knowledge is also used as a control variable in the adoption analysis.  Since the 
presence of innovation-specific knowledge may make an organization more likely to 
adopt, this variable is used as a control. 
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4.4.3 Control Variables 
Control variables were considered in the analysis to account for factors that could 
impact an organization’s decision to adopt.  In addition to the primary variables 
previously described, four control variables listed below have been included in the 
analysis. 
Pre/Post Free Agency. Over the course of the sample, players were awarded a 
path to free agency based on the results of a court decision and collective bargaining.  
This provided access to players with direct knowledge of the 49ers West Coast Offense.  
Prior to this development, players were only free to sign with a different team if they 
were released by the original organization.  Based on this, skilled players rarely became 
free agents prior to 1993.  Just as the NFL rule changes in 1978 opened the door for more 
passing, the change in free agency allowed for greater player movement and thus an 
easier access to information about the West Coast Offense.   Using binary coding, this 
variable was recorded based on whether the team season was before or after the advent of 
free agency in the NFL. 
Division.  Prior innovation research has noted that geographic proximity to the 
innovation can be an influential factor in diffusion (Abrahamson, 1991).  As the 
competitor may have greater knowledge about the efficiency of the innovation, they 
would recognize the benefits before those in other areas.  In the NFL, teams in the same 
division play 2 games against each other during the season.  Teams are bunched into 
divisions based primarily on geography, thus necessitating a control variable for teams in 
the same division as the San Francisco 49ers.  The 49ers competed in the NFC West over 
the duration of the sample.  However, due to expansion, the NFL modified the teams in 
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each division in 2002.  Although the 49ers divisional opponents change, a binary variable 
was used to note teams in the same division as the 49ers while they were running the 
West Coast Offense. 
 
Coaching Turnover.  The hiring of a new coach may be indicative of a change in 
routines or desire to adopt an innovation.  Turnover at the management level implies that 
the organization is moving in a different direction for the future, possibly to include 
adopting new routines, innovations, or practices.  For this study, coaching turnover is 
included as an alternate explanation as a path to or reason for adopting the innovation.  
Organizations may replace a coach when performing poorly or when the previous coach 
takes a job with a different team.  When the head coach is replaced, most of the assistant 
coaches are also supplanted as they work for both the general manager and the head 
coach.  Coaching turnover will be measured as a binary variable indicating whether or 
not a given season was the first under a new head coach.   
 In addition to the measured control variables above, policies of the National 
Football League also serve as a control within the study.  For example, professional 
football teams share approximately 70% of revenue with each other, thereby reducing the 
financial advantages that may exist from one organization to another.  Additionally, the 
number of players on a roster is restricted to 53 with 8 players allowed on a practice 
squad.  This prevents teams from stockpiling talent and limiting competitors’ access.  
Teams in the NFL also operate within the boundaries of a salary cap and salary floor.  
Generally, throughout the sample the floor was set at 80% of the cap, reducing the 
possibility of teams buying the best players.  As a result of these policies, teams are all 
 67 
 
approximately the same size, with similar levels of revenue and expense.  Although 
variation exists, the differences here are primarily due to market size and represent an 
industry where firms are significantly alike. 
 Guaranteed revenues may act as a disincentive for innovation adoption (Fort, 
1995); however, firms are still able to capture financial rewards from winning despite the 
requirement of sharing the incremental revenue.  As a further deterrent, the single largest 
revenue stream in the NFL is derived from a centrally negotiated television contract.  The 
prevalence of revenues generated outside of the team’s management may also create a 
disincentive to develop local revenue streams or talented teams.  However, many 
organizations have invested significantly in facilities and other assets.  Support for this 
investment is illustrated through academic studies identifying a link between winning and 
revenues (Irwin, et al., 1999; Barajas, et al., 2005).  Additionally, other academic studies 
have used similar sport samples when testing for firm performance (Berman, et al., 2002; 
Aime, et al., 2011).  Finally, the results from the NFL seasons dispute the notion that 
teams have incentive to collect revenue sharing checks without attempting to win.  If 
firms were engaged in this behavior, the same teams would continually finish near the 
bottom of the standings.  Since there is frequent variation in the best and worst teams in 
the league, this concern is alleviated for the purposes of this study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
 Using the variables and methods defined in Chapter 4, I now discuss the results of 
the analysis.  I begin by describing the regression formulas used and proceed by 
discussing the combined results from the first three hypotheses surrounding adoption of 
the innovation.  Continuing with the fourth hypothesis, I discuss the role of knowledge in 
the adoption process before concluding with fifth hypothesis and the results of firm 
performance after the adoption decisions are made. 
 
5.1 Analysis  
The model described below was tested using regression analysis, conducted in 
SPSS.  As the dependent variable is binary, logistic regression was used.  The following 
regression equation served as the foundation for the analysis of the first three hypotheses: 
 
y = PassLag(x1) + RunLag(x2) + DefLag(x3) + FreeAgency(x4) + Division(x5) + 
Knowledge(x6) + CoachChange(x7) + Team1(x8) + …. + Team32(x39) + error 
 
The model was estimated using panel methodology through logistic regression with fixed 
effects for teams (Wooldridge, 2002).  The fixed effects model was selected for two 
primary reasons.  First, this method accounts for any potential endogeneity created by the 
capability estimations and the inherent longitudinal characteristics of the cross-sectional 
panel data.  This methodology mitigates biases of using similar capability measurements 
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for different years.  Second, the explanatory variables in question (capabilities) are 
attributed to the resources held by the organization.  Due to the relative consistency of 
routines within a team, there is less variance over time.  Since these routines, inclusive of 
players and coaches, are held by a team, each team was included as a control variable 
within the analysis of H1, H2 and H3.  This distinguishes between the impact of the 
hypothesized capabilities and other team specific factors. 
Model estimations were created using the two step approach, starting with the 
control variables and adding in independent variables to determine an increase in 
explanatory power.  In a binary logistic regression as illustrated above, the R
2
 term is 
unable to accurately represent the power of the model.  In this case, the Cox and Snell R
2
 
and Nagelkerke R
2
 will be used as a substitute.  Support for the capabilities hypotheses 
(H1, H2, H3) was gauged through the significance of the respective beta coefficients.  
Moderation of knowledge from the innovator was tested using a binary variable for 
knowledge.  This variable was tested using the following regression equation: 
 
y = PassLag(x1) + Knowledge(x2) + (PassLag)(Knowledge)(x3) + FreeAgency(x4) + 
Division(x5) + error 
y = RushLag(x1) + Knowledge(x2) + (RushLag)(Knowledge)(x3) + FreeAgency(x4) + 
Division(x5) + error 
 
The resulting significance of the regression’s beta coefficient was used to evaluate the 
merit of Hypothesis 4.  Wald coefficients were used to assist in the interpretation of the 
model’s results. 
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 Hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c were tested using regression with a dependent variable 
of point differential, an independent variable of innovation adoption, and free agency and 
division as control variables.  For each capability (complementary, substitutive, and 
neutralizing), only those firms that have been classified as such were included in the 
testing.  As these firms were infrequently categorized as excelling in a capability 
classification for consecutive years, a fixed effects model is not needed for this analysis.  
Classification was based on the quality of each set of processes (passing, running, and 
defense) when compared to each other and across the league.  The best process was 
defined as the team strength, and a team is said to have a capability in an area if their best 
unit, or strength, is within the top quartile of the league.  Significance was measured at 
the .05 level.  The regression equation for each capability is listed below: 
 
y = Adoption(x1) + Division(x2) + FreeAgency(x3) + error 
 
5.2 Hypotheses Regarding Adoption and Non-Adoption of the Innovation 
 I begin by presenting the descriptive statistics and correlations associated with the 
variables considered in the analysis.  This information can be found in Tables 2 and 3 
below: 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.  
Adoption 897 0 1 .2252 .4179  
Point Diff 897 -265 315 0 97.9425  
Pass Lag 897 -5.227 0 -2.416 1.1058  
Run Lag 897 -4.793 0 -2.152 1.0371  
Def Lag 
Knowledge 
897 
897 
-5.147 
0 
0 
1 
-2.172 
.3066 
1.0171 
.4458 
 
Division 897 0 1 .1115 .3149  
Free Agent 
PY Point Diff 
CoachChg 
897 
897 
897 
0 
-265 
0 
1 
315 
1 
.6566 
0 
.2051 
.4751 
97.812 
.4040 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlations 
 
Adoption PointDif PassLag RushLag DefLag Knowledge Division FA CoachChg PYPtDif 
Adoption 1 
         
PointDiff 0.051 1 
        
PassLag .147** 0.177** 1 
       
RushLag 0.061 0.212** -.178** 1 
      
DefLag 0.005 0.302** -0.015 0.361** 1 
     
Knowledge .527** 0.005 0.093** 0.037 -0.072 1 
    
Division 0.021 -.089** -.071* -.095** 0.006 0.069** 1 
   
FA .300** 0 0.269** -0.023 .097** 0.138** 0.182** 1 
  
CoachChg 0.004 -.152** -.089** -.107** -.10** 0.036 -0.013 0.013 1 
 
PYPtDif -0.012 -0.004 -0.044 0.064 0.032 0.032 0.01 0 0 1 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 4 (located below) displays the results of the logistic regression.  Inclusion of the 
independent variables increases the significance of the model when compared to the 
model of only control variables.  Support for this increase of explanatory power is found 
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through the increase of the Cox & Snell R
2
 and Nagelkerke R
2
.  The full model is 
significant and provides support for the adoption hypotheses.  This suggests that firms do 
consider the quality and type of their resources when making adoption decisions.  
Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the advent of free agency was significant as a 
control variable.  This is consistent with other research that suggests market constraints 
can have an impact on firm behaviors.  By decreasing the mobility of resources, this 
knowledge was restricted to the source and unavailable to competitors.  Once these 
market restrictions were removed, knowledge and resources could freely flow to where 
they are most valued, thereby allowing more organizations to adopt the innovation 
(Rottenberg, 1956; Coase, 1960).   
While free agency provides some explanation for adoption, this connection may 
be better explained by the departure of coaches working under Bill Walsh.  Most 
adopting teams, particularly early adopters, acquired knowledge from the innovator.  
While Walsh was still coaching in the 1980’s, there was little turnover on the staff.  
However, after the retirement of Walsh in 1989, the 49ers began to slowly lose a few 
staff member.  George Seifert, Walsh’s successor, did retain the majority of the staff and 
coaches elected to take jobs as opportunities arose over the following years.  This 
correlates very closely in the sample with the advent of free agency.  NFL free agency 
rules still ensure that top players (those around whom an adoption decision could be 
made) remain with their original teams.  The combination of player availability and 
coaching departure from the 49ers staff provide an alternate explanation of the 
significance of the free agency control variable.  As such, the model was run and 
interpreted without the variable.  Results can be found in Table 5.
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 While free agency was significant, the control variable of organization location, 
tracked through division, did not provide any noteworthy predictive power to the model.  
Unlike in some technical industries, specific knowledge to this innovation is not 
concentrated in a particular region.  The free flow of knowledge in the free agent NFL 
helped diffuse the innovation throughout the industry. 
 
Table 4: Regression Model for H1, H2, and H3 – With Free Agency 
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef./Exp(B) Std. Err. Coef./Exp(B) Std. Err. 
PassLag   1.527** .145 
RunLag   1.365 * .148 
DefLag   1.308 .159 
Division .547 .565 .618 .587 
Free Agent 15.838** .382 13.173** .402 
Knowledge 32.088** .369 28.109** .363 
Coach Change .814 .292 .978 .303 
Constant -23.394 6946.026 -21.210 6891.927 
N 897 897 
Wald chi-square 581.568** 599.794** 
Cox & Snell .477 .488 
Nagelkerke .708 .723 
df 35 38 
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Table 5: Regression Model for H1, H2, and H3 – Without Free Agency 
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
 
5.2.1 Hypothesis One – Complementary Capabilities and Adoption 
In Hypothesis 1, I proposed that there will be a positive correlation between firms 
with complementary capabilities and adoption of the innovation.  The logistic regression 
models presented above show a positive and significant relationship between the two 
variables as identified through the beta coefficient in the Model 2 (p = .004, SE = .145 
with free agency; p = .000, SE = .135 without free agency).  Through interpreting the 
odds ratios in the analysis, these results suggest that for every one unit increase in 
standard deviation (closer to the industry leader) for capabilities complementary to the 
innovation, organizations are approximately 53% more likely (96% without free agency 
as a control) to adopt the innovation.  This result is found for all organizations within the 
sample, regardless of their relative capabilities at the start of the decision process.  As the 
capabilities of competitors evolve closer to that of those needed to implement the 
innovation, firms become more likely to adopt.  Thus Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef./Exp(B) Std. Err. Coef./Exp(B) Std. Err. 
PassLag   1.963** .135 
RunLag   1.469** .140 
DefLag   1.249 .149 
Division 1.511 .518 1.609 .548 
Knowledge 26.253** .310 23.906** .318 
Coach Change .888 .276 1.133 .289 
Constant 0 7337.030 -18.671 7168.253 
N 897 897 
Wald chi-square 506.344** 544.322** 
Cox & Snell .431 .455 
Nagelkerke .640 .675 
df 34 37 
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5.2.2 Hypothesis Two – Substitutive Capabilities and Adoption 
 As hypothesized in Chapter 3, firms with capabilities that may be substitutive of 
those used in the innovation will also be more likely to adopt the innovation.  The results 
of the analysis, illustrated above in Table 3, provide support at the 0.05 level for this 
hypothesis (p = .035, SE = .148 with free agency; p = .006, SE = .140 without free 
agency).  The data and analysis suggest that an ability to substitute capabilities can 
influence adoption decisions.  For every one unit increase in standard deviation (closer to 
the industry leader) for capabilities substitutive to the innovation, organizations are 
approximately 37% more likely (47% without free agency as a control) to adopt the 
innovation.  While this suggests that substitutive capabilities may be less likely to lead to 
adoption than complementary capabilities, the difference in coefficients of substitutive 
and complementary capabilities is non-significant.  Although this difference is small, the 
result may be due to a greater variance in levels of complementary capabilities in the 
early years of the sample.   
 
5.2.3 Hypothesis Three – Neutralizing Capabilities and Adoption 
 For Hypothesis 3, I theorized that firms with neutralizing capabilities will be less 
likely to adopt the innovation than firms with complementary or substitutive capabilities.  
Given that these organizations possess resources that decrease the value of the 
innovation, adopting the innovation would require a complete bundling and redeployment 
of the current resources.  Therefore, organizations with these capabilities would be less 
likely to adopt the innovation.  While predictions of adoption cannot be made based on 
the possession of neutralizing capabilities (p = .091, SE = .159 with free agency; p = 
 76 
 
.134, SE = .149 without free agency), comparing the beta estimates to complementary 
and substitutive capabilities can provide insight into how these resources are viewed.  
Parameter testing is used to determine significant differences between betas for 
Hypothesis 3.  Significance between complementary capabilities and neutralizing 
capabilities is found in the model without free agency.  In comparing the beta for 
neutralizing capabilities to the beta for complementary capabilities, the test statistic of 
1.7217 is significant at the 0.01 level (p = .004).  This result is not replicated for 
substitutive capabilities (F-stat = .9612, p = .5381).  Further, significant differences are 
not found in the model inclusive of free agency as a control variable (complementary and 
neutralizing F-Stat = .8057, substitutive and neutralizing F-Stat = .2680).  Surprisingly, 
the coefficient for neutralizing capabilities is positive and non-significant.  This may be 
partially explained by the number of teams with strong performance across all three 
capabilities.  While the presence of neutralizing capabilities may not predict adoption, 
there is partial evidence that neutralizing capabilities are less of a factor in adoption 
decisions than substitutive or complementary capabilities.  As such, partial support is 
found for Hypothesis 3. 
 
5.3 Hypotheses Regarding the Role of Knowledge 
 As proposed in Chapter 3 and 4, the presence of complementary or substitutive 
capabilities alone may not be enough to achieve high levels of performance after 
adopting the innovation.  The complexity of the innovation, particularly in regards to the 
number of decision points and roles of actors, may necessitate acquisition of direct 
knowledge from the innovator.  For this analysis, a test of moderation was conducted 
 77 
 
using adoption of the innovation, knowledge from the innovator, capability strength, and 
firm performance.  Results of the moderation test can be found in Tables 6 and 7 below. 
 
Table 6 – Complementary Capabilities and Knowledge 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. 
Division -20.289 42.951   -9.722 45.072   -9.995 45.696 
PassLag 
  
   8.941 25.085  16.090 59.315 
Knowledge 
  
-23.990 32.072 -29.114 50.309 
Know*PassLag 
   
  -8.756 65.642 
R
2
 0.005 90.285 0.026 91.590    0.027 92.766 
Change in R
2
 
   
0.021 
 
0.001 
 
Note: Free Agency was included in the analysis but is omitted above due to all adopting 
firms with complementary capabilities falling after players earned this right after 1993. 
 
Table 7 – Substitutive Capabilities and Knowledge 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. 
FA 35.519 39.698 47.617   39.305     48.021 39.681 
RushLag 
  
53.714   26.733  -101.343 250.958 
Knowledge 
  
  0.648    67.294   108.253 185.996 
Know*RushLag 
   
  156.871 252.421 
R
2
 0.022 94.576 0.129    91.937   0.139   92.804 
Change in R
2
 
   
     0.107 
 
    0.010 
 
*p < 0.05 
Note:  All teams were in different divisions as San Francisco, thus division is omitted 
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5.3.1 Hypothesis Four – Knowledge as Moderator 
 In Hypothesis 4, I suggest that knowledge from the innovator will moderate the 
relationship between innovation adoption and firm performance for firms with 
complementary or substitutive capabilities.  First, adopters of the innovation were 
identified and included for this analysis.  Second, from this group, firms with substitutive 
or complementary capabilities were identified by determining each organization’s 
strength and classifying those within the top quartile of the industry leader as having a 
capability in this area.  In total, 80 firms were identified and included in this analysis.  
With this sample set, and illustrated through the table above, the inclusion of knowledge 
does not create a moderating effect, thus failing to provide support for the hypothesis.   
 There are a few reasons for the lack of support for the proposed hypothesis.  The 
primary reason is that most organizations did indeed have knowledge from the innovator.  
Of the 80 firms included in the analysis, 67 had hired a former Bill Walsh assistant.  Of 
those organizations that did not, all were since 2001 and only one organization did not 
employ knowledge from the innovator immediately prior to the given season.  The role of 
knowledge appears to be equally important to adoption of this complex system even 32 
years after initial implementation.  Despite significant knowledge available to firms, they 
still seem to prefer to hire an expert in the routines.  While this does not leave a verifiable 
sample, professional football teams imply through hiring practices that knowledge of an 
innovation is essential to adopting.   
There were no significant results in the entire model including independent and 
interaction variables.  The other control variables were also found to have no impact on 
firm performance.  Another potential reason for this is the high performance of most 
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firms within the sample.  Adopting firms with complementary capabilities had a positive 
point differential of over 61 points, while firms with substitutive capabilities scored over 
31 points more than their opponents.  A wide range of performance still exists amongst 
these organizations; however, the distribution of teams centers on a point differential 
significantly higher than the mean for an entire season.  Combined with the high number 
of adopters with knowledge, this aspect of the sample limits the ability to accurately 
determine the impact of knowledge on the performance of adopters.   
 
5.4 – Hypotheses Regarding Performance 
 As previously described, I have proposed that adoption decisions based on 
organizational capabilities will have predictable impacts on firm performance.  Firms 
were classified as having complementary, substitutive, or neutralizing capabilities as 
described in Chapter 4 and in the previous section.  From the entire population of 
professional football teams since 1979, I use a sample of 155 organizations with 
complementary capabilities, 164 with substitutive capabilities, and 140 with neutralizing 
capabilities.  These groups were used to examine the performance of innovation adopters 
and non-adopters.  The means listed in Table 8 below were used in the testing of the 
hypotheses. 
Table 8 – Mean Point Differentials by Capability Types 
 Adopters Non-Adopters 
Complementary 61.930 8.045 
Substitutive 31.514 19.732 
Neutralizing -9.394 28.907 
 80 
 
5.4.1 – Hypothesis 5a –Complementary Capabilities and Performance 
 In Hypothesis 5a, I suggest that adopters with complementary capabilities will 
achieve higher levels of performance than those that do not adopt.  Given the similarity in 
capabilities, these organizations have the appropriate resources to quickly bring in the 
necessary knowledge and adopt the innovation.  Through the regression listed below, the 
hypothesis is supported (t-stat = 2.833, p = 0.005).  The analysis suggests a positive and 
significant relationship between the two at the 0.05 level.  See Table 9 below for further 
details. 
Table 9 – Regression for Complementary Capabilities 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
FA 35.935* 17.326  16.458 18.281 
Division -60.831* 30.211 -66.788* 29.611 
Adoption 
  
  51.755* 18.281 
R
2
 0.047 95.934   0.095 93.792 
Change in R
2
 
  
0.048 
 
  
     
    
* p < 0.05 
 
5.4.2 – Hypothesis 5b – Substitutive Capabilities and Performance 
 Hypothesis 5b states that adopting organizations with substitutive capabilities will 
outperform those that do not adopt the innovation.  As the group without a distinct 
similarity or difference to the innovation, these firms would be better suited to acquire the 
necessary resources and adopt.  However, the analysis did not provide support for this 
hypothesis.  There is not statistical evidence of increased performance from either 
adopting or not adopting the innovation.  See Table 10 below for further details. 
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Table 10 – Regression for Substitutive Capabilities 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
FA -9.589 14.393 -13.228 14.678 
Division 37.853 24.976 42.255 25.249 
Adoption 
  
19.665 17.214 
R
2
 0.018 89.111 0.026 89.027 
Change in R
2
 
  
0.008 
 
5.4.3 – Hypothesis 5c – Neutralizing Capabilities and Performance 
 In Hypothesis 5c, I propose that organizations with neutralizing capabilities 
should not adopt the innovation and that non-adopters will achieve greater performance 
that firms that do adopt.  Through these neutralizing capabilities, these organizations have 
the ability to decrease the value of the innovation.  To adopt may require forfeiting the 
current advantages possessed by the firm.  This hypothesis is supported (t-stat = -2.342, p 
= .021).  The analysis of variance suggests a significant and positive difference between 
these two groups.  See Table 11 below for further details. 
 
Table 11 – Regression for Neutralizing Capabilities 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
FA -2.123 16.388 9.779 16.908 
Division 29.441 24.569 35.981 24.337 
Adoption 
  
-44.795* 19.126 
R2 0.01 92.451 0.05 91.189 
Change in R2 
  
0.04 
 
* p < 0.05 
In total, the combination of adoption and capability categorization provided predictability 
for firm performance for organizations with complementary and neutralizing capabilities.  
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For firms with complementary capabilities, adoption led to greater performance.  
Meanwhile, non-adopters fared significantly better for organizations with neutralizing 
capabilities.  Given that no support in either direction was found for firms with 
substitutive capabilities, performance within these organizations is determined by 
additional factors not included in this analysis.  See Table 12 below for a summary of all 
hypotheses. 
 
 
Table 12 – Summary of Results by Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1 Supported 
Hypothesis 2 Supported 
Hypothesis 3 Partially Supported 
Hypothesis 4 Not Supported 
Hypothesis 5a Supported 
Hypothesis 5b Not supported 
Hypothesis 5c Supported 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Discussion 
 In this section, I discuss and interpret the results that were presented in the 
previous section.  This dissertation sought to answer questions about how capabilities 
impact adoption decisions and how these decisions impact firm performance.  The role of 
knowledge acquisition for adopters and non-adopters was also questioned as complex, 
industry-changing ideas are not easily imitated.  I find that adoption is guided by the 
organization’s capabilities, though the role of knowledge is undefined.  Firms with 
complementary and substitutive capabilities are more likely to adopt the innovation due 
to the similarity of resources and less risk absorbed in the process of redeploying assets.  
Adoption benefits the firms with complementary capabilities as they achieve higher 
levels of performance after their decision than firms that do not adopt; however, adopting 
organizations with substitutive capabilities have no statistical difference in performance 
compared to non-adopters.  In contrast, neutralizing capabilities are not a predictor of an 
organization’s likelihood of adoption.  Interestingly, non-adopting firms with neutralizing 
capabilities outperform organizations with the same capability type that have 
implemented the innovation.  Although support was not found for knowledge as a 
moderating factor, the vast majority of adopters acquired knowledge in their adoption 
process.   
 The remainder of the section is divided into three parts.  I first discuss the 
hypotheses that are related to adoption of the innovation.  Next, the post-decision 
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performance is discussed.  The final section covers the importance of adopting through 
acquiring knowledge from the innovator. 
 
6.1.1 Discussion of Results Regarding Adoption 
 In Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, I suggested that adoption decisions would be 
influenced by the type of capabilities that a firm has in relation to those necessary to 
implement the innovation.  The rationale for these hypotheses is supported by the 
literature on both innovation and capability development.  Complementary capabilities 
have been recognized as vital to the commercialization process and are used as an 
explanation for why competitors often prosper from advancements made at other firms 
(Teece, 1983).  Logically, the idea that capabilities can be substituted for one another in 
pursuit of the same goal suggests that firms with the ability to use alternative but similar 
capabilities in the commercialization of a competitor’s innovation would also benefit 
from adoption.  However, building on Porter’s (1980) theory of competition and threat 
neutralization, firms with these types of resources are able to create advantages through 
rejecting the innovation and reducing the value of competitor’s capabilities. 
 The first two hypotheses regarding adoption based on capability categorization 
were supported and significant (p < 0.05), while partial support was found for the third 
hypothesis.  The regression analysis considered all firms in the industry and all years 
completed since the innovation.  As such, the inclusion of data on capability strength for 
all firms served as a control for each other.  Organizations may be strong in multiple 
areas, but the design of this analysis was able to simultaneously control for the relative 
strength and weakness of all capabilities.  In addition, controls were provided for other 
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explanations for adoption provided in the literature, including geographic proximity to 
the innovator, managerial change, access to knowledge specific to the innovation, and 
organization specific factors. 
 In addition to the variables previously described, a number of other variables were 
considered for inclusion in the model.  Variables related to players were reviewed, 
including players acquired from the 49ers, draft results (categorized by capability), and 
average draft pick (talent).  These variables were not used due to the usage of coaching 
change better capturing a shift in strategic resources.  As mentioned previously, the 
majority of player movement involves average or below average talent.  The controls 
offered by these measures are better captured in the selected variables.  Further, 
hypothesis testing was conducted using different permutations of the described variables.  
Inclusion of any of the listed control variables did not change the significance of the 
results on any of the hypotheses. 
 The results suggest that organizations take an internal look at their abilities and 
resources before making adoption decisions.  Using this study to build on prior research, 
adoption decisions can be conceptualized as a two-by-two matrix with focus of the 
analysis (internal v. external to the firm) and rationale of the decision (economic v. 
social) on the axes.  See Table 13 below. 
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Table 13 – Matrix of Innovation Research 
 
 
 
Organization 
Capabilities 
 
Innovation-specific 
research 
Fad/Fashion 
influence from own 
firm 
Fad/Fashion 
influence from 
industry 
Internal                          External 
 
The results can be seen as suggesting an economic and internal rationale.  Prior literature 
on the economic justification for adoption focused on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the innovation.  As soon as firms can assess the efficacy of a new product or service, this 
line of research proposes that they adopt the innovation.  Using a highly successful 
innovation, the results from the first three hypotheses suggest that firms also consider 
their own capabilities in assessing adoption decisions. 
 The results from the preceding analysis are consistent with other economic 
justifications for adoption.  When a firm recognizes the potential for economic benefit 
(considering risk), adoption occurs.  However, previous economic models had primarily 
considered macro-conditions and those specific to the innovation.  This study recognizes 
the internal economic factors necessary in the adoption process.  Although testing for 
social models was not a component of this study, the importance of social networks in 
professional football (Fast & Jensen, 2006) suggests that some of the adopters may have 
been influenced in this manner.   
Economic 
 
 
 
 
Social 
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 Taken together, the results from the first three hypotheses provide an answer to 
the question of how firms use current capabilities in innovation adoption decisions.  
Rather than following the crowd or the latest trend, adopters are able to recognize 
congruence between their own resources and previously developed capabilities.  Having 
similar capabilities, or complementary resources, allows the firms to understand how to 
maximize return on the investments (from either the cost of new knowledge or adaptation 
to current resources) needed to adopt the innovation.  Likewise, non-adopters understand 
that innovation would not be successful using the assets possessed by their firm.  For this 
reason, firms with neutralizing capabilities are less likely to adopt the innovation.  The 
accumulation of resources and the building of routines in areas that neutralize 
competitor’s innovations is a viable alternative to pursuing novel resource recombination.  
In comparison to the innovation, the competitors use their own capabilities to assess the 
likelihood of future performance should the innovation be adopted.  Organizations with 
complementary or substitutive capabilities are likely to adopt, while those with 
neutralizing capabilities are likely to reject the innovation.  
The time frame considered in this study (over 30 years) helps to illustrate how the 
non-adopters can continue with their decision long into the diffusion process.  Another 
important characteristic of this population is the frequent changes in quality of resources.  
Over the 32 year sample, the industry leader in each of the three measured classes of 
capabilities fluctuated significantly.  Of the 32 organizations participating in professional 
football, 15 were the industry leader in passing for at least one season, 16 led in rushing, 
and 16 led in defense.  Further, during the sample period, 29 of the 32 organizations led 
in at least one category (of the 3 that did not, one only participated for 17 of the seasons 
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and another only for 29 seasons).  Fifteen of the organizations were the industry leader at 
two different categories over the sample period.  This variation suggests that each firm 
possessed differing capabilities and would have had different motivations to adopt, and 
that many of the non-adoption decisions were made with high quality resources.  Further, 
with one exception, every other organization employed a coach that had previously 
worked with the innovator at some point in the sample.  Additionally, the variation in 
performance suggests that implementing a new innovation into an organization is a very 
complex process, one that involves a high degree of risk and knowledge. 
With most adoption coming from organizations with high quality resources, firms 
with limited capabilities must first develop their assets before adopting.  Low quality 
resources will typically lead to low quality results, even with an innovative deployment.  
Many of the organizations in the sample lacked a distinct capability in any area.  Some of 
these firms did adopt the innovation, but found that their performance continued to lag 
behind industry leaders.  Imitating innovation cannot make up for poor resources in a 
firm; however, if these resources can be brought to a competitive level, adopting can 
provide performance benefits. 
This information provides greater depth to the traditional S-Curve of innovation 
proposed by Rogers (1995).  Adopters at each stage appear to be those who have similar 
capabilities to the innovator.  Those with access to the originator’s knowledge are more 
likely to become early adopters.  However, as time moves on and the information about 
an innovation spreads throughout the industry, the innovation becomes part of the core 
set of knowledge available to firms wishing to match assets to capabilities.  When these 
assets are highly mobile and change frequently, firms can regularly bundle and deploy 
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resources in differing combinations.  These decisions are further enabled when the cost of 
divestiture is low.  Although time was not a variable considered in this analysis, further 
research may consider when holders of each capability type adopt the innovation.  The 
late adopters described by Rogers may hold a particular type of capability or they may 
have low quality resources across the spectrum.  Additional research may also lend 
insight into the decision process for firms with comparatively poor quality assets.  These 
firms, as well as those with neutralizing capabilities, are typically not discussed in the 
diffusion literature.  These hypotheses and subsequent analyses provide empirical 
evidence of adoption patterns and begin to create the basis for theories that link 
capabilities, adoption, and performance. 
Beyond the S-Curve, this analysis also supports and extends Teece’s (1983) 
theory of complementary capabilities.  In verifying adoption decisions based on resources 
needed to commercialize the innovation, this dissertation supports the argument that 
innovation alone is not enough to achieve high levels of performance.  The analysis also 
extends Teece’s argument to other capability types with support for how firms perceive 
the potential success of implementation.   
Given the significant results of substitutive capabilities, firms appear to perceive 
these as delivering the same benefits as complementary capabilities in the adoption 
process.  However, the actual benefits for adopters with substitutive capabilities seem 
questionable.  Teece (1983) was very specific in explaining the role of complementary 
resources in the commercialization of an idea.  Prior scholars have also commented on 
the need for routines and systems in place to fully maximize the potential of the 
innovation (Schumpeter, 1934; Teece, 1983; Rogers, 1995; Cassiman & Veugelers, 
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2006).  The findings in this dissertation suggest that firms consider these other resources, 
but may overstate their capacity to substitute one resource for another.  Although this 
behavior is only statistically significant for firms with substitutive and complementary 
capabilities, the number of adopting firms possessing neutralizing capabilities suggests 
that some of these organizations may be trying to re-bundle these resources into different 
roles. 
 One interesting result concerns the decisions of firms with neutralizing resources.  
Possession of these resources does not constitute immediate rejection of the innovation.  
Many of these firms adopt the innovation even while possessing resources that may 
render the innovation useless.  There may be several reasons for this result.  First, 
organizations with neutralizing capabilities may feel that their future ability to replicate 
performance with current resources is lower than their ability to achieve similar 
performance by adopting the innovation.  Additionally, these organizations may represent 
fad and fashion explanations for adoption.  Finally, firms with neutralizing capabilities 
may acquire knowledge from the innovator as a defensive maneuver to prevent 
competitors from adopting.  This notion is supported in the numerous examples of firms 
with neutralizing capabilities hiring key employees from the innovator and subsequently 
not adopting the innovation. 
 Although only included as a control variable, the statistical significance of free 
agency may highlight an important ability to acquire knowledge assets both at the 
managerial and staff/player levels.  Significant market restraints still exist within 
professional football, but the loosening of player mobility restrictions opened the door for 
the acquisition of players in adoption decisions.  Another factor tied to this period in the 
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sample is the retirement of Bill Walsh, innovator of the West Coast Offense.  As he left 
the San Francisco 49ers, coaches may have sought opportunities out of concern for their 
long term employment.  Competing firms may also have sensed a chance to acquire key 
knowledge at a lower price.  The 49ers had high levels of coaching stability throughout 
Walsh’s tenure and maintained most of the staff even after his departure.  The strong 
performance of the organization in the years after Walsh can be tied to the continued 
success of the innovation and the talent throughout the organization at the coaching and 
playing levels.  As the departure of key 49ers coaches overlaps with the advent of free 
agency, a conclusion about the impact of free agency is undetermined.  The combination 
of these events led to an increased amount of adoption consistent with Hypotheses 1, 2, 
and 3. 
 
6.1.2 Discussion of Results Regarding Knowledge Acquisition 
 In Hypothesis 4, I hypothesized that knowledge would moderate the relationship 
between innovation adoption and firm performance.  Grounded in the theories of 
innovation and knowledge transfer, this hypothesis seeks to illustrate how adopters 
handle the complexity of the idea and need to understand the visible and invisible 
components.  Adopting firms with strengths in complementary or substitutive capabilities 
were included in the analysis as this hypothesis only dealt directly with these 
organizations.  The hypothesis was not significant in regards to firms with both 
complementary and substitutive capabilities.   
Among the reasons for non-significance is the near exclusive list of adopting 
innovations utilizing knowledge from the innovator.  With the high number of firms 
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utilizing the innovator’s knowledge, testing the impacts of “adopting through hiring” 
versus “adopting through mimicry” becomes difficult.  Further, as time progresses, fewer 
individuals remain in the NFL from Bill Walsh’s staffs.  Many of these coaches have 
retired, thus leaving firms that wish to adopt to obtain knowledge one or two steps 
removed from the innovator.  Firms may also prefer to hire from an organization 
currently using the innovation if they perceive this knowledge to be inclusive of the 
original innovation plus new wrinkles added by the adopting organization.  The 
innovation is still successful but now adopting organizations must seek knowledge one 
step removed from the originator. 
The increased prevalence of passing offenses is a long term outcome of the West 
Coast Offense’s development.  Not only did adopters often achieve success over an 
extended period of time, they also shifted the way that firms compete within this industry.  
In 1979, when the West Coast Offense debuted, teams threw the ball on approximately 
46% of plays.  The most recently completed season, 2011, saw teams throw the ball 
almost 56% of the time.  In short, professional football offenses have completely reversed 
themselves in the ratio of passing to running.  This shift had a major impact on the 
number of adopting teams and capability quality throughout the sample.  For example, in 
2011, the league-leading New Orleans Saints passed for over 5300 yards.  In comparison, 
1979’s leader, the San Diego Chargers, only threw for about 3900, a figure that would not 
have been in the top third in 2011.  Firms were forced to continually develop capabilities 
complementary to the West Coast Offense, with or without direct knowledge of the 
innovation.  The overall improvement of complementary capabilities is evidence of 
significant diffusion of the ideas embedded in the series of routines.   
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 Although not hypothesized in this study, there were a number of firms that 
acquired knowledge from the innovator but did not adopt the innovation.  Although each 
firm would have a different rationale for their decision, the role of the individual with 
innovation knowledge may impact the overall outcome.  As this knowledge holder may 
not be in a position to make the decision, other managers may have legitimate reasons for 
not adopting.  In this case, the organization may have had tremendous success with 
different routines and be hesitant to risk losing this advantage.  Further, the cost of the 
knowledge does not include acquisition of other resources needed to implement the 
innovation.  These assets may require additional investment that the firm is not willing to 
make.  Instead of acquiring several new pieces, these non-adopters may be attempting to 
adapt the innovation to their resources.  The adaptation process may be time consuming, 
with the benefits not accruing until years later.  For the purposes of this sample, coaches 
are fired and players retire, thus yielding different results that cannot be captured in this 
analysis.  Further studies could investigate a setting where resources are given longer to 
adapt.  Additionally, research could help understand how innovation-specific knowledge 
is used if the idea is not adopted. 
For firms that did adopt, this sample contains many interesting characteristics that 
strengthen the argument for direct knowledge.  Complex innovations, typically based on 
knowledge of the routine’s actors, can be difficult to break apart into the many decision 
points.  In the case of the innovation being tested in this analysis, each competitor had 
visual, recorded evidence of how the actors processed the knowledge and executed the 
idea.  Despite the public documentation of the innovation, firms still felt the need to 
acquire direct knowledge before adopting.  Although curious at first, this behavior is 
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supported by theory.  Research has found that firms frequently hire from competitors in 
an attempt to build their own knowledge stocks and reduce the competitive advantage 
held by rivals (Song, et al., 2003; Aime, et al., 2010).  Firms in this sample appear to 
follow specifications in these academic theories as most have included knowledge from 
the innovator as a prerequisite for adoption.  
 Previously, I posed the research question: does the acquisition of knowledge from 
the innovator assist in adopting the innovation?  Although the test for moderation was 
non-significant, the behavior of firms suggests that they indeed feel that their 
performance will be higher if they adopt through acquiring knowledge from the 
innovator.  In an industry where knowledge of competitor routines is readily available 
and worker mobility is high, firms acquire knowledge of the innovation through hiring to 
assist in deconstructing and implementing the innovation.  Not only is this knowledge 
acquired in the vast majority of the adoptions, but firms value this knowledge to such a 
degree that very few attempt to deconstruct the innovation themselves without first 
acquiring direct knowledge of the innovation.  Of the adopters without knowledge from 
the innovator, almost all organizations had previously employed an individual with 
access to the idea.  As time progressed, the information became incorporated into the new 
firm’s knowledge stocks and organizational capital.  At some point in the future, the 
employee’s market value to the adopter decreased and was no longer worth the resources 
to maintain the link to the innovator.  One step removed from the innovation, these firms 
become sources of knowledge for future adopters as they possess a new and important 
type of information – the ability to successfully transition an organization to the 
innovation.   
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The dynamic nature of the diffusion process decreases the need for long time 
adopters to possess direct knowledge of the innovation.  This also provides justification 
for firms that move away from routines specific to the advancement before returning to 
the innovation.  While an organization cannot maintain links to an idea indefinitely, 
exploring ideas may prove to be beneficial, particularly if other resources are in flux.  
Future empirical research on how firms cycle between new and old ideas may provide 
insight into the duration of information within the firm’s organizational capital. 
Many innovative ideas involve the development of a new business model that 
derives different asset values than recognized by the market.  Using the innovation in this 
analysis as an example, the understanding of capabilities becomes vital in these instances.  
Innovative structures inherently change the value of assets and often neutralize the value 
of previous capabilities.  This study continues by illustrating how resources devalued by 
the innovation can still remain significant if properly deployed. 
 
6.1.3 Discussion of Results on Firm Performance and Adoption 
 Building on the previous discussion of adoption of innovation and knowledge 
acquisition, I will examine the hypotheses related to firm performance after these 
decisions are made.  The hypotheses are broken out by capability and compare adopters 
and non-adopters. 
 Hypothesis 5a suggests that amongst firms with complementary capabilities, 
adopters will achieve higher levels of performance than non-adopters.  This hypothesis 
was positive and significant at the 0.05 level (t-stat = 2.833).  This finding supports the 
idea that firms with complementary capabilities should adopt the innovation due to the 
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ability to create better firm performance by using the novel ideas.  As discussed in the 
previous section, these firms frequently adopt through hiring an individual(s) with direct 
knowledge of the innovation.  The combination of this knowledge, the complementary 
capabilities, and adoption of the innovation creates an advantage in the marketplace for 
these organizations.   
Despite the success generated by this deployment of resources, only 27.74% (43 
out of 155) of firms with complementary capabilities adopted the innovation.  While the 
exact reasons for non-adoption are unknown, prior literature on fads and fashions may 
provide some explanation here.  If the social pressures were such that the innovation was 
derided (as evidenced by competitor comments about the innovation as “gimmicky” or 
“soft”), organizations may have incentive to reject the innovation despite evidence of 
success.  Firms may also have failed to adopt due to the high cost of acquiring 
knowledge.  However, the performance difference implies that the cost of foregoing this 
opportunity appears to outweigh the incremental cost of knowledge.  Firms with these 
capabilities are the best positioned to capitalize on their good fortune. 
 These results speak to the importance of recognizing capability strengths and the 
necessary resources to implement innovative routines.  As an empirical test consistent 
with and confirming Teece’s definition of complementary capabilities, the increase of 
performance by adopters highlights the value of these assets.  The surprise of the result 
comes not from the consistency with prior theory, but in the failure of application at the 
practitioner level. 
 For firms with substitutive capabilities, I hypothesized that adopters would also 
achieve higher performance that those who did not adopt.  However, H5b was not 
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supported.  There were not statistically significant differences in the performance of 
adopters and non-adopters with substitutive capabilities.  With a t-stat of 1.142 and p-
value of 0.255, the performance of these organizations appears to be governed by other 
factors beyond adoption of the innovation or quality of the substitutive capability.  This 
hypothesis was based on the premise that firms had enough flexibility in their resources 
to ask the routine actors to play different roles.  However, these individuals may not be 
capable of performing at the necessary level or may decide to seek employment at a 
different firm where their familiar skill sets are utilized. 
 The challenge with substitutive capabilities lies in how the resources are replaced.  
Despite the correlation between substitutive capabilities and adoption, the decision to 
change course is most difficult for these organizations.  Unlike firms with complementary 
capabilities, there is a greater degree of re-deployment of resources and likely a need to 
acquire significant amounts of new knowledge.  If the chasm between currently held 
resources and those needed to implement the innovation is too wide, firms will struggle 
due to the misappropriation of strategy and assets.   
While much of the current resources could be repurposed, this inherently risky 
process involves asking individuals to complete different tasks with differing levels of 
comfort.  Given that these individuals have excelled at their previous task (thus 
developing the capability), asking them to stand out in a new area may be difficult.  For 
this reason only about 22% of firms with substitutive capabilities adopted the innovation 
(37 out of 165).  In general, all classifications of firms with substitutive capabilities 
performed at a near average level, while adopting firms with complementary capabilities 
and non-adopting firms with neutralizing capabilities were well above the mean.  The 
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point differential for substitutive capability teams represents less than one win per season 
(or a less than 5% increase in total performance) between adopters and non-adopters.  
Represented in wins and losses, this difference is almost 2.4 wins, or approximately a 
30% increase in performance) for the other capability classifications (Schatz, 2003).  As 
with the complementary capabilities, almost all of the adopters utilized knowledge from 
the innovator.  The three organizations that did not had previously employed an 
individual with this direct knowledge and had been utilizing the innovation for a number 
of years. 
Firms with substitutive capabilities that struggle may also lack strategic clarity or 
be experiences aversion to change.  Prior literature has recognized the significant 
organizational commitment needed to implement novel ideas (Damanpour, 1991; Tidd, et 
al., 2005).  As high-performing individuals are being asked to modify their skills towards 
a different area, they may be resistant and leave the organization.  To combat this, 
organizations may compromise on the degree to which new skills are needed.  When 
differences persist between the adopter and innovator’s routines, the adopting firm will 
struggle to achieve the full benefits of the new system.  The results indicate that many of 
the organizations with substitutive capabilities found themselves with this dilemma. 
Non-adopting firms with substitutive capabilities faced similar decisions but 
failed to increase performance.  Once an industry discovers a more efficient way to 
complete a task, firms that continue to operate with less efficient processes will be at a 
disadvantage (Rogers, 1995).  Short of combating the innovation with a new idea or 
reducing its value through other capabilities, firms that utilize older ideas have greater 
obstacles to overcome.  Although the data indicates that some of these firms were 
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successful, the performance seems to be due to the relative quality of the resources rather 
than the deployment.  In these instances, managers may have taken advantage of 
dominant resources rather than risk new combinations of deployment.  Understanding the 
sustainability of this performance would be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Adoption theories based on substitutive capabilities are complex.  In many ways, 
managers of these firms face the most difficult decisions as clear benefits do not accrue 
from adopting or rejecting the innovation.  However, this dissertation contributes to the 
literature on substitutive capabilities by exploring how these decisions have impacted 
performance.  Although a specific recommendation is unavailable, these organizations 
should recognize that non-adoption is a viable route, depending on the quality of their 
resources and the availability of knowledge.  Resource flexibility and skill diversity 
contribute to an ability to re-deploy current assets.  This research provides a greater 
understanding of the adoption decisions faced by managers of organizations with 
substitutive capabilities. 
In Hypothesis 5c, I proposed that non-adopting firms with neutralizing 
capabilities would achieve higher levels of performance than adopters with similar 
capabilities.  This hypothesis was supported at the 0.05 level (t-stat=-2.342, p-value = 
0.021), suggesting that organizations with neutralizing capabilities should not adopt the 
innovation.  In contrast to the previous literature on adoption, this distinct set of 
organizations not only lacks the necessary resources to adopt, but lower performance is 
demonstrated by firms that attempt to do so. 
When compared to other capability types, a smaller percentage of neutralizing 
capability firms decided to adopt.  Out of 141 organizations, only 33 adopted the 
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innovation (23.57%), despite the fact that 43 of the firms had knowledge from the 
innovator.  Only 20 of the 43 firms with knowledge adopted the innovation.  Thus, the 
rate of adoption by firms with neutralizing capabilities and knowledge from the innovator 
is approximately 46%.  In comparison, 61% (30/49 teams) of firms with complementary 
capabilities and knowledge adopted, as did 70% (35/50 teams) of organizations with 
substitutive capabilities and knowledge from the innovator.  This indicates that some 
organizations were hesitant to implement the innovation even with the knowledge and 
that firms may have acquired the knowledge for reasons other than adoption. 
 Why would a firm intentionally decide not to adopt a high performing 
innovation?  This research question is addressed through the results of this analysis.  
Firms would reject an innovation if they have neutralizing resources and could expect to 
perform better than peers that do adopt.  Further, this decision appears to be sustainable 
as several firms have achieved success without ever adopting over the 30 years since the 
innovation was born.  Unlike the previous literature that proposes full diffusion 
throughout an industry, this analysis illustrates how capabilities play a more significant 
role in adoption decisions and post-decision performance.  The development of 
neutralizing capabilities remains a viable option to adopting the innovation.   
Given the path dependence of resource acquisition (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), some 
firms may possess more organizational capital in areas unrelated to the innovation.  
Beyond the initial decision, evidence suggests that firms can continue to develop 
capabilities in the area of their expertise.  Since no statistical performance differences 
exist between complementary adopters and neutralizing non-adopters, firms need not 
immediately move towards acquiring innovation-specific resources.  Resources still 
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maintain similar values even after revolutionary innovations.  Proper deployment of the 
resources appears to be the driving factor of success. 
Strategy scholars have previously recognized the importance of the managers’ 
role in asset deployment (Sirmon, et al., 2008).  This research extends the understanding 
of deploying assets in relation to innovation adoption decisions.  Recognizing that there is 
an appropriate capability mix needed to mimic a competitor, this dissertation outlines 
how mangers should respond to revolutionary innovation.  This dissertation suggests that 
performance is driven by the capabilities analyzed and deployed by managers in adoption 
decisions.  As other research has examined the importance of the manager’s abilities 
(Sirmon, et al., 2008), support is provided here that takes a broader look at the 
organization’s capacity to compete.  
 
6.2 Conclusion 
 This dissertation sought to explore how capabilities influence adoption processes, 
as well as post-decision performance.  In contrast to previous literature within strategic 
management and other disciplines, I suggest that capabilities are a primary driver of 
innovation adoption decisions and illustrate how firms may have a sound, economic 
rationale for not adopting an innovation.  Through an investigation of firm capabilities 
and knowledge acquisition, I examined how the combination of these assets impacted 
adoption decisions and firm performance. 
 The results suggest that firms with capabilities complementary or substitutive to 
the innovation are likely to adopt the innovation, while those with neutralizing 
capabilities are less likely to adopt due to consideration of other factors in the decision 
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process.  Adopters almost always seek knowledge specific to the originator before 
implementing the idea in their organization.  This helps overcome the information 
asymmetry between competing organizations and leads to successful outcomes.  While 
the impact of knowledge acquisition is difficult to assess from the preceding analysis, 
organizations seemed to give direct knowledge significant weight in the decision process.  
Interestingly, firms with neutralizing capabilities are more successful when they do not 
adopt the innovation.  This helps explain why firms can continue to succeed despite 
failing to adopt innovations that have proven to be successful throughout the industry.  
The results of this dissertation have significant implications for practice and research.  I 
continue with a discussion of both areas and conclude by discussing the limitations of this 
study, along with extensions for future research. 
 
6.2.1 Implications for Research 
 The results have several implications for strategic management research.  Most of 
the literature focuses on characteristics of innovation, the speed of diffusion, or how 
firms innovate.  The emphasis on entrepreneurship and statements about innovation as 
the lifeblood of organizations detract from some of the most difficult decisions firms 
make.  This research attempts to re-position the discussion by taking a broader view on 
the overall capabilities of a firm.  Although this dissertation represents an initial look at 
why firms may intentionally reject an innovation, the area presents numerous areas to 
extend the current knowledge base. 
 First, this dissertation challenges the assumption that innovations can benefit all 
firms within an industry.  Through an examination of non-adopting firms, I extend the 
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work of scholars who have called for research free from the pro-innovation bias present 
in much of the previous work (Abrahamson, 1991; Abrahamson, 1996; Rogers, 1995).  
Differing from literature born from marketing, communications, or sociology, this work 
also considers an innovation created to benefit one organization.  As opposed to studies 
of vaccines or crop yields, this research was targeted towards knowledge that an 
organization intends to hold rather than distribute.  By taking a strategic perspective, I 
find specific scenarios where non-adoption is a superior strategy. 
Additionally, this dissertation builds on the categorization of capabilities by 
explicitly defining three different types of capabilities.  This dissertation spotlights the 
centrality of these capabilities in innovation adoption decisions.  These definitions can 
help conceptualize how capabilities can be deployed when compared to an innovation or 
competitor.  As an extension of Teece’s work on complementary capabilities, I contribute 
to the literature by illustrating how firms can develop these types of capabilities by 
bundling and deploying different packages of resources.  I also illustrate how capabilities 
limit the bundling and deployment options.  Over time firms can adjust their capabilities 
by bringing in new assets; however, as demonstrated in the analysis, capabilities dictate 
how an organization should respond to revolutionary innovations.  Scholars may find 
benefit from continuing to study how capabilities both enhance and limit the strategic 
direction of the firm. 
 Contributions from this paper help explain innovation diffusion patterns.  By 
noting that firms may have incentive to reject an innovation, the discussion of adoption 
shifts from a question of “when” to “if” or “how.”  Building on the literature of non-
adoption (Greve, 2011, Abrahamson, 1991), this dissertation introduces an economic 
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rationale for rejecting an innovation.  Instead of an inefficient innovation or social 
pressures, firms may lack the necessary capabilities to capitalize on the new idea.  In this 
instance, a firm may find greater efficacy in developing neutralizing resources than 
risking a re-bundling of inferior assets or paying market wages for in-demand talent.  
Although social connections and concerns can influence strategic decisions, I suggest that 
firms need not rely on patterns of competitor behavior to succeed.  This project also 
suggests that additional economic analysis on non-adoption could benefit our 
understanding of routines and the flexibility of capabilities.   
Finally, this paper links adoption decisions to performance.  By isolating the 
impact of an adoption decision, this work is able to measure post-decision performance 
while simultaneously controlling for the quality of other resources.  This paper utilizes a 
professional football sample of 32 organizations with the same goals, number of 
employees, and with similar resources to minimize the other variables that could impact 
decisions.  As firm performance represents a central tenant of strategic management 
research, this paper provides boundary conditions to the benefits derived from 
innovation.  Hopefully, this study will inspire further research on the boundaries of 
diffusion. 
 
6.2.2 Implications for Practice 
 This research has many significant implications for managers.  As diffusion 
theories illustrate how firms consider peers and characteristics of the innovation before 
adoption, this dissertation suggests that firms can be successful even if they do not adopt 
the latest ideas.  Despite the temptation to always follow the market leader or adopt the 
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latest trend, managers should consider their current capabilities before making a key 
strategic decision.  A key takeaway for managers is to recognize the value of your own 
resources.  As resources are distributed unevenly throughout most industries, the ability 
to recognize and exploit the benefits accrued from a firm’s assets should remain a focus 
of managers, especially when considering divergent strategies.  Comparing capabilities to 
competitors, and more specifically the innovation, can illustrate the different ways to 
compete within a marketplace.   
 As managers are specifically tasked with bundling and deploying assets, this 
dissertation highlights the importance of matching routines with resources.  In the 
development of new routines, performance is impacted by both the quality and 
deployment of resources.  Options are available to managers that involve continuing to 
deploy resources in the current manner or risking a decrease in performance through re-
bundling.  Firms with substitutive resources may experience the most challenging 
decisions based on how similar the current routines match the innovation.  Innovating 
firms may also consider the ability of competitors to replicate the new ideas.  Firms in 
industries where many competitors possess similar resources may want to consider 
whether other organizations would be able to competently bundle current resources to 
match the innovation.  
 
6.3 Limitations and Areas of Future Research 
 In this dissertation, I have attempted to address specific research questions in a 
manner that allows for generalizability across multiple industries and organizations.  In 
doing so, there are potential areas of difference between those firms included in the 
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analysis and how other industries may operate.  I will address the limitations of this study 
that evolve from these facts.  I also propose future areas of research that have arisen 
through the process of developing the theories, methodology, and analysis that are 
included in this dissertation. 
 The primary units within this analysis are the organizational capabilities.  
Defining the routines and resources of an organization in the previously described 
manner is limiting in several ways.  One concern is the necessity of defining who has or 
does not have a capability in a given area.  Organizations are inherently more familiar 
with their resources than can be inferred from statistical analysis.  In this manner, 
adoption decisions are made by organizations based on how they project these resources 
to perform in the future.   Since all of the capabilities are defined by the performance of 
individuals, managers may have more knowledge of ability and quality than are noted in 
this study.  As such, firms may perceive their capabilities (or lack thereof) differently.  
This is a particular limitation when a firm appears to have similar capabilities in multiple 
areas. 
 Another important limitation of this dissertation is the reliance on archival data to 
test the propositions.  Given that the research considers decisions over a thirty year time 
frame, surveying decision makers is not possible.  While the measures included in the 
work represent adoption considerations of managers, a more direct method of accessing 
this information could provide more nuanced explanations for the surprising number of 
firms that made theoretically unsound decisions.   
The data examined in this study represent the entire population of professional 
football teams since the innovation.  The use of this population eliminates some problems 
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that could arise through sampling and allows for more specific claims to be made about 
the results.  However, as the non-adoption theory is drawn from and extended to other 
industries, the primary limitations are based on the nuances of the industry. 
 Analysis of adoption decisions and performance in multiple industries could also 
strengthen the findings of this dissertation.  Although empirically sound, the 
idiosyncrasies of professional football may distort the realties faced by organizations in 
other fields.  For example, knowledge from the innovator may play a different role in a 
field where strategies and performance are not directly observed by competitors.  Since 
this project was designed to develop theories of non-adoption, the specifics of 
professional football are less relevant than the overall behaviors.  Future research in other 
industries, using different methods and analytics, could provide deeper theoretical 
insights into adoption decisions.   
 Although useful for empirical analysis, most industries do not have the parity 
represented in this sample.  Prior research has found that firms tend to follow larger and 
more influential competitors within an industry (Aboulnasr, et al., 2008).  These diffusion 
patterns may change based on the centralization of resources within an industry.  One 
firm may hold all of the necessary assets required to develop neutralizing capabilities, 
thus driving higher rates of adoption.   
 Future research should examine the flexibility of resources in different routines.  
Actors within routines are frequently asked to process information at different decision 
points.  The ability to play multiple roles within a routine or to improve upon routines 
could impact an organization’s willingness to adopt an innovation.  Flexibility increases a 
manager’s deployment options and allows a firm to respond faster to environmental 
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changes.  Exploring how these resources impact adoption decisions could provide a 
strong avenue of theoretical development for the future. 
 Finally, understanding how knowledge from the innovator is used by adopters 
would be a natural extension of this research.  This is particularly interesting for firms 
that possess substitutive or neutralizing resources.  Previous research has illustrated the 
difficulty of transferring knowledge.  This paper presents several examples of successful 
and unsuccessful transfer – explaining what led to these performance differences could 
assist in our understanding of the communication and acquisition of knowledge.  Theory 
related to each capability type or the depth of the knowledge would be tremendously 
valuable for academics and practitioners. 
 This dissertation has built on the work of the diffusion of innovation, 
organizational capabilities, and knowledge acquisition.  While my goal was to introduce 
and attempt to answer questions related to capabilities and innovation adoption decisions, 
I hope that the results from this work inspire future research around innovation and the 
strategic development of capabilities.  As innovation continues to receive attention from 
firms and researchers, I hope that this study encourages others to create new theories and 
explanations for adoption and diffusion. 
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